Contemporary philosophers argue that social epistemology plays a vital role in theories of justification by expanding the framework of knowledge acquisition beyond the individual to the collective. They posit that individuals often rely on testimonies, social practices, and institutions to acquire knowledge, which necessitates considering how justification is socially mediated. For instance, the credibility of information sources, the dissemination of knowledge through social networks, and the collective validation of evidence all influence the justification of beliefs. This collective aspect is especially significant in the context of the internet and the digital age, where knowledge is often collaboratively constructed and critiqued. Hence, social epistemology provides a more comprehensive account of how beliefs are justified within a community or society.

In theories of justification, a 'defeater' is a piece of information or argument that, if introduced, would undermine a belief's justification. Defeaters are crucial in analysing knowledge claims because they highlight conditions under which justification fails. In relation to the Gettier problem, defeaters are especially relevant—they represent the hidden errors or elements of luck that, once revealed, demonstrate why a justified true belief might still fail to be knowledge. For instance, a belief based on a reliable process can be defeated if new evidence shows the process was not reliable in that particular instance. Addressing defeaters is therefore integral to refining our understanding of justification in the face of Gettier-style challenges.

Foundherentism can be seen both as a compromise and as a distinct epistemological theory. It attempts to synthesise foundationalism's base of infallible beliefs with coherentism's web of mutually supportive beliefs, advocating that some beliefs are more foundational while still needing coherence for justification. It acknowledges foundational beliefs that are not inferentially justified but are still fallible and subject to coherence testing. This hybrid approach is designed to leverage the strengths and compensate for the weaknesses of both foundationalism and coherentism, aiming to provide a more robust framework for epistemic justification. Foundherentism thus presents itself as a distinct model by integrating the key aspects of both theories while also addressing their limitations.

Contextualism challenges traditional theories of justification by asserting that the standards for justification are not fixed but can change depending on the context. This approach allows for a more nuanced and flexible understanding of knowledge, as the threshold for what counts as a justified belief varies with different epistemic contexts—such as everyday life versus scientific investigation. The potential benefits of contextualism include its adaptability to different situations and its capacity to account for the varying degrees of scrutiny that different knowledge claims require. For example, in a casual conversation, the justification needed to know the time is much less stringent than what is required in a courtroom setting to know the details of an event. Contextualism thus offers a pragmatic and versatile approach to epistemic justification.

Infinitism addresses the regress problem by proposing an infinite series of non-repeating reasons as a solution to the need for justification. Instead of looking for a foundational belief or a coherent system, infinitism accepts that justification can be an endless chain. The key argument is that each reason provided offers some degree of justification, and together, the infinite series provides comprehensive support for the belief. Although the theory faces criticism, especially regarding its practicality—since humans cannot possibly comprehend an infinite series—it offers a unique approach by reframing the regress problem as a fundamental feature of epistemic justification, rather than a dilemma to be solved.