Social constructivism challenges the natural basis of moral values by asserting that values are not discovered but created by societies. It argues that moral concepts do not exist independently of human societies and are instead the product of social interactions and collective human invention. According to this view, what is considered moral is determined by social agreements and can vary greatly between different cultures and historical periods. Social constructivism suggests that our morals are shaped by social norms, legal systems, religious teachings, and political ideologies, rather than by biological or natural laws. Therefore, moral values are seen as malleable and subject to change as societal views evolve.

Meta-ethical analysis plays a crucial role in studying the origins and nature of moral values by investigating the meaning, reference, and implications of moral concepts. It delves into questions like whether moral statements express factual propositions or emotive reactions, and whether moral values exist independently of human beliefs. Meta-ethics examines the underlying assumptions about morality that inform ethical theories and helps to clarify the arguments for and against various claims about moral objectivity, universality, and the influence of culture and nature on ethics. By scrutinising these fundamental questions, meta-ethics provides the philosophical tools to critically engage with different ethical theories and their foundations.

Ethical theories approach moral dilemmas involving cultural and universal morals conflict in various ways. Universalist theories, like Kantian deontology, would advocate for adherence to universal moral principles that transcend cultural norms. In contrast, cultural relativist positions might suggest that the context of the culture should primarily influence moral decisions. Other theories, such as ethical pluralism, recognise the legitimacy of multiple moral perspectives and suggest that moral dilemmas require a nuanced approach that considers the strengths of different moral arguments. Virtue ethics, focusing on character rather than rules, may offer a middle ground, suggesting that a wise and virtuous agent would navigate such conflicts by considering both the cultural context and universal moral ideas.

Moral subjectivism, which suggests that moral values are based on individual or cultural beliefs, can lead to ethical nihilism if it is assumed that all moral claims are equally valid, thus implying that no moral claims are truly valid. This could suggest that moral values are meaningless or non-existent. Philosophers counter this by differentiating between 'strong' and 'weak' forms of subjectivism. Weak subjectivism allows for personal or cultural moral standards without negating the meaningfulness of moral discourse. Additionally, even within subjectivism, there can be internal consistency and logical frameworks that prevent it from collapsing into nihilism, such as the concept of 'ethical solipsism', where one's moral beliefs are consistently applied to oneself, thereby maintaining a coherent moral stance.

The evolutionary perspective posits that moral values have originated through the process of natural selection. It suggests that behaviours now regarded as morally good or altruistic conferred evolutionary advantages in terms of survival and reproduction. Traits like cooperation, fairness, and altruism helped our ancestors live in groups, which increased their chances of survival against predators and in resource acquisition. Over time, these behaviours became ingrained and have been socially reinforced as they contribute to the stability and cohesion of societies. This view argues that moral instincts are not the product of rational thought but are evolutionary adaptations.