OCR Specification focus:
‘the Geneva Conference 1954 and the division of Vietnam; Eisenhower’s policies towards Indochina; Diem’s government of South Vietnam (1955–1963), its relations with Hanoi’
The Geneva Conference of 1954 shaped the Cold War in Asia by dividing Vietnam and redefining U.S. commitments. Eisenhower’s responses revealed evolving American attitudes to containment.
The Geneva Conference, 1954
Background to Geneva
The Geneva Conference was convened after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu (May 1954). France sought to negotiate peace in Indochina, while the wider Cold War powers aimed to prevent the spread of Communism without triggering direct confrontation. Delegates included France, Britain, the USSR, China, the USA, and representatives of the Viet Minh.
Key Decisions
The Geneva Accords (July 1954) resulted in significant territorial and political restructuring:
Vietnam was divided along the 17th Parallel into a Communist-controlled North under Ho Chi Minh and a non-Communist South, provisionally under Emperor Bao Dai.
Elections were scheduled for 1956 to reunify the country, supervised internationally.
Both sides agreed to withdraw their troops to respective zones and not seek foreign military alliances.
Laos and Cambodia were also recognised as independent neutral states.
Geneva Accords (1954): Agreements that temporarily divided Vietnam at the 17th Parallel, creating Communist North Vietnam and anti-Communist South Vietnam, with elections promised for 1956.
The United States did not sign the accords, regarding them as a temporary arrangement, but publicly pledged not to disturb them by force.
Map showing the Vietnam demarcation line at the 17th parallel and the DMZ established in the wake of the 1954 Geneva Accords. Place names clarify the location of the boundary relative to Hue, Quang Tri, and the central coast. The base map is from a U.S. government source; later-war cartographic notations do not change the boundaries relevant to 1954. Source
Eisenhower’s Policies towards Indochina
Containment Strategy
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s approach to Vietnam was framed by the domino theory, which argued that if one nation in Southeast Asia fell to Communism, others would follow. This concept reinforced the American view that Indochina was critical to the security of Asia.
Domino Theory: The Cold War belief that the fall of one country to Communism would trigger the collapse of neighbouring states in a chain reaction.
Reasons for Intervention
Eisenhower’s reluctance to support the Geneva settlement came from:
Fear that free elections would guarantee a Communist victory under Ho Chi Minh.
The desire to build a non-Communist state in South Vietnam as a barrier against further expansion.
Distrust of French colonial influence and the belief that U.S. leadership was necessary to maintain stability in Asia.
Building South Vietnam
Eisenhower committed to strengthening the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam):
Support was shifted from Emperor Bao Dai to Ngo Dinh Diem, a nationalist and Catholic politician who became Prime Minister in 1954.
The U.S. supplied financial aid, military advisers, and diplomatic recognition to bolster Diem’s regime.
American propaganda promoted South Vietnam as a “model state”, countering Communist success in the North.
Diem’s Government of South Vietnam, 1955–1963
Consolidation of Power
Diem ousted Bao Dai in a rigged referendum in 1955, becoming President of the Republic of Vietnam. He refused to hold the 1956 national elections, claiming they would not be free under Communist control in the North.
Photograph of the official referendum tally posted at Saigon City Hall following the Diem–Bảo Đại vote in 1955. The strikingly lopsided results signalled Diem’s consolidation of power and the birth of the Republic of Vietnam. This image is a U.S. government photograph (public domain). Source
Diem established a one-party state dominated by his family and loyalists.
He persecuted Buddhists and other non-Catholic groups, alienating the majority population.
His government received extensive American backing despite its authoritarian style.
Relations with Hanoi
The North Vietnamese, led by Ho Chi Minh, maintained a strong commitment to eventual reunification. Tensions deepened as:
The North supported Communist insurgents in the South, laying the foundations for the National Liberation Front (NLF) later.
Diem’s repression of opposition increased instability, making his rule fragile.
The South’s refusal to hold elections was used by the North as propaganda to delegitimise Diem internationally.
U.S. Role in Sustaining Diem
The Eisenhower administration regarded Diem as the only viable anti-Communist leader, ignoring his flaws because:
His government fitted into the U.S. defensive perimeter in Asia, linking containment with allies like the Philippines and Japan.
The alternative of allowing elections risked handing power to Ho Chi Minh, seen as a puppet of Moscow and Beijing.
U.S. policymakers feared that abandoning Diem would undermine American credibility after the Korean War.
Wider Cold War Implications
Regional Significance
The Geneva settlement and Eisenhower’s subsequent actions reflected wider Cold War dynamics:
The Sino-Soviet alliance supported the Viet Minh, showing unity of the Communist bloc in Asia.
U.S. refusal to endorse Geneva highlighted Washington’s commitment to an independent strategy in Asia, separate from European colonial aims.
Vietnam became the testing ground for American interventionism, foreshadowing deeper involvement under later presidents.
Legacy of Eisenhower’s Decisions
The refusal to support the 1956 elections entrenched the division of Vietnam.
By propping up Diem, the U.S. created dependence that would later spiral into military escalation.
Eisenhower’s domino theory cemented Vietnam’s symbolic importance in U.S. foreign policy, shaping decisions for the next two decades.
The Geneva Conference of 1954 thus marked a turning point in Asian Cold War geopolitics. Eisenhower’s policies ensured that Vietnam would remain divided, unstable, and central to global ideological conflict.
FAQ
The U.S. objected to the temporary division of Vietnam and feared elections would legitimise Communist victory under Ho Chi Minh. Washington viewed the settlement as appeasement, reminiscent of Munich 1938.
Instead, the U.S. issued a unilateral declaration promising not to disturb the agreements by force, but also making clear it was not bound to enforce them. This allowed America freedom to pursue its own policy in Indochina.
China, under Zhou Enlai, encouraged the Viet Minh to compromise by accepting temporary division. Beijing sought to avoid direct U.S. intervention and regional instability on its southern border.
China’s influence helped secure agreement on elections, but it also limited the Viet Minh’s immediate gains by denying them nationwide power. This created tension between Vietnamese nationalists and their Chinese allies.
The Eisenhower administration promoted South Vietnam as a showcase for democracy and economic progress.
U.S. media highlighted land reforms, schools, and infrastructure, despite corruption and repression.
Propaganda contrasted “freedom” in the South with “dictatorship” in the North.
This narrative aimed to reassure Congress and allies that containment in Asia was working.
Ho Chi Minh accepted the settlement reluctantly, recognising it as a tactical setback. He believed nationwide elections would eventually bring victory, given his popularity.
However, many Viet Minh leaders criticised the compromise, seeing it as betrayal of their struggle for full independence. This dissatisfaction encouraged greater commitment to underground activities in the South.
The cancellation undermined the Geneva Accords’ credibility and provided Communist propaganda with evidence of U.S. hypocrisy.
Internationally, it:
Strained U.S. relations with allies who had hoped for peaceful reunification.
Gave the Soviet Union and China an opportunity to criticise American interference.
Convinced many in the developing world that the West opposed genuine self-determination when it threatened their strategic interests.
Practice Questions
Question 2 (6 marks):
Explain two reasons why President Eisenhower supported Ngo Dinh Diem’s government in South Vietnam after 1954.
Mark scheme:
Award up to 3 marks for each well-explained reason.
Reason 1 (up to 3 marks):
1 mark for identifying that Eisenhower feared Ho Chi Minh would win national elections.
1 mark for noting that Diem was seen as a strong anti-Communist leader.
1 mark for explaining that supporting Diem aligned with the policy of containment and the domino theory.
Reason 2 (up to 3 marks):
1 mark for identifying that the U.S. wanted a stable non-Communist state in South Vietnam.
1 mark for recognising that Diem’s government was promoted as a “model state” with U.S. financial and military support.
1 mark for explaining that abandoning Diem would harm U.S. credibility after the Korean War.
Question 1 (2 marks):
In which year were the Geneva Accords signed, and along which parallel was Vietnam divided?
Mark scheme:
1 mark for correct year: 1954
1 mark for correct parallel: 17th Parallel
