OCR Specification focus:
‘the Geneva Conference 1954 and the division of Vietnam; Eisenhower’s policies towards Indochina; Diem’s government of South Vietnam (1955–1963), its relations with Hanoi’
The Geneva Conference of 1954 marked a decisive moment in the Cold War in Asia. It reshaped Vietnam’s future, defined US involvement, and set the stage for escalating conflict.
The Geneva Conference, 1954
Context and Background
Following the defeat of French colonial forces at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), the major powers convened in Geneva to resolve the crisis in Indochina. The conference brought together France, Britain, the USSR, China, the USA, and representatives from the rival Vietnamese factions: Ho Chi Minh’s communist Viet Minh in the North, and Bao Dai’s State of Vietnam in the South.
Key Decisions and Terms
The conference produced a series of agreements known as the Geneva Accords:
Vietnam divided temporarily at the 17th parallel, with the Viet Minh controlling the North and the State of Vietnam holding the South.

Map showing the demarcation line and Vietnamese DMZ centred on the Bến Hải River, established by the Geneva Agreements (1954). It locates Quảng Trị province and depicts the buffer zone either side of the line. Source
Nationwide elections scheduled for 1956 to reunify Vietnam under a single government.
Both sides agreed to ceasefire arrangements and a withdrawal of foreign troops.
Cambodia and Laos were also recognised as independent states, free from colonial rule.
Geneva Accords (1954): Agreements resulting from the Geneva Conference that temporarily divided Vietnam and scheduled reunification elections for 1956.
The USA, however, refused to sign the accords, fearing that elections would deliver victory to Ho Chi Minh, given his popularity and nationalist credentials. Instead, the US pledged to support South Vietnam as a bulwark against communism.
Eisenhower’s Policies towards Indochina
Containment and the Domino Theory
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was committed to the policy of containment and articulated the Domino Theory in 1954, arguing that if one Asian nation fell to communism, others would follow.

Schematic of the Domino Theory, depicting how a communist victory in one state could trigger regional collapse. This concept framed US containment thinking in Southeast Asia after 1954. Source
Domino Theory: The belief that the fall of one nation to communism would trigger the collapse of neighbouring states in a chain reaction.
This conviction made Vietnam central to American foreign policy in Asia. Eisenhower rejected neutralism and backed a strong anti-communist regime in the South to prevent reunification under Ho Chi Minh.
Building South Vietnam under Ngo Dinh Diem
In 1955, Eisenhower helped install Ngo Dinh Diem as the leader of the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). Diem, a nationalist but strongly anti-communist Catholic, was viewed in Washington as the best option for stabilising the South.
Key US policies included:
Financial aid to support Diem’s government and economy.
Military advisers sent to strengthen the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN).
Support for Diem’s decision to refuse participation in the 1956 elections, arguing that free elections were impossible under communist rule in the North.
This refusal effectively entrenched the division of Vietnam and sowed the seeds for later conflict.
Diem’s Government, 1955–1963
Nature of Rule
Diem established a regime that was authoritarian and heavily reliant on US aid. His government prioritised loyalty and Catholic interests, alienating the majority Buddhist population.
Land reforms failed, as large estates remained intact while peasants continued to face hardship.
The regime engaged in corruption and nepotism, with Diem’s family wielding disproportionate power.
Political opposition was suppressed, with arrests and censorship silencing critics.
Relations with Hanoi
From the outset, relations between Diem’s South and Ho Chi Minh’s North were hostile.
The North promoted land redistribution and claimed legitimacy through revolutionary credentials.
In contrast, Diem positioned himself as the defender of freedom against communism, bolstered by American propaganda and material support.
Hanoi encouraged the development of opposition in the South, leading to the early stirrings of insurgency by communist sympathisers.
US Commitment and Limitations
Eisenhower and later administrations continued to funnel aid, with US spending in Vietnam reaching hundreds of millions of dollars by the late 1950s. However, doubts emerged about Diem’s effectiveness. His inability to win popular support meant that US backing was propping up a fragile regime, increasing the likelihood of deeper American involvement.
Consequences of the Geneva Division and Eisenhower’s Policy
The temporary division of Vietnam became permanent, setting the stage for decades of conflict.
By refusing elections, Diem, supported by the US, ensured the continuation of a divided Vietnam.
Eisenhower’s embrace of the Domino Theory justified long-term US involvement in Indochina, linking Vietnam to the broader Cold War struggle.
Diem’s flawed governance weakened South Vietnam’s legitimacy, contributing to the eventual rise of the National Liberation Front (NLF) in the early 1960s.
The Geneva Conference and Eisenhower’s subsequent policies ensured that Vietnam became the focal point of Cold War rivalry in Asia, laying the foundation for America’s deepening commitment.
FAQ
The US feared that national elections scheduled for 1956 would almost certainly result in a victory for Ho Chi Minh, given his popularity as a nationalist leader.
Washington argued that elections would not be genuinely free under communist rule. Instead, the US chose to support South Vietnam as a separate state, framing this as part of its broader Cold War strategy of containment.
Both China and the USSR pressured Ho Chi Minh to accept the division of Vietnam at the 17th parallel rather than insisting on complete national victory.
Their goal was to avoid further direct conflict with Western powers while still securing communist control in the North. This compromise reflected their broader strategic interests during the early Cold War.
The US claimed elections would be unfair, arguing that the North’s repressive political system and lack of free press would make meaningful democratic choice impossible.
By backing Diem’s decision, Eisenhower effectively legitimised the permanent division of Vietnam, while presenting it as a defence of democracy against communism.
Religious tensions: Diem, a Catholic, alienated the Buddhist majority.
Weak land reform: his policies failed to satisfy peasants, reinforcing inequalities.
Corruption and nepotism: his family dominated positions of power, reducing trust in government.
These weaknesses undermined his credibility and made South Vietnam increasingly reliant on US aid and support.
The North pursued land reform and reconstruction under communist principles, portraying itself as the legitimate government of all Vietnam.
Meanwhile, Diem’s South rejected unification and consolidated its authority with US assistance. Hanoi responded by encouraging communist sympathisers in the South, setting the stage for insurgency and the later rise of the National Liberation Front.
Practice Questions
Question 1 (2 marks)
In which year were national elections scheduled under the Geneva Accords to reunify Vietnam?
Mark Scheme:
1956 = 2 marks
Any other date = 0 marks
Question 2 (6 marks)
Explain two reasons why President Eisenhower supported Ngo Dinh Diem as leader of South Vietnam after 1955.
Mark Scheme:
Award up to 3 marks for each developed explanation.
Reason 1: Diem was strongly anti-communist, which aligned with Eisenhower’s policy of containment and the Domino Theory.
Identification of anti-communism = 1 mark
Link to US policy of containment = 1 mark
Clear explanation of why this mattered to Eisenhower = 1 mark
Reason 2: Diem was seen as a stabilising figure who could build a strong non-communist state in South Vietnam.
Identification of Diem as a stabilising option = 1 mark
Link to US desire to prevent communist unification = 1 mark
Clear explanation of how this helped secure US influence = 1 mark
Maximum 6 marks. Partial answers should be credited accordingly.