OCR Specification focus:
‘Détente, the SALT talks and Ostpolitik; Brezhnev Doctrine’
The period of Détente represented a cautious easing of Cold War tensions between East and West from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, shaped by nuclear realities.
Background to Détente
After decades of hostility, both the United States and the Soviet Union faced mounting pressures to reduce confrontation:
Economic burdens of the arms race strained both superpowers.
The Vietnam War drained U.S. resources and morale.
The Soviet Union faced a need for Western technology and agricultural imports.
The threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) from advanced nuclear arsenals encouraged negotiation.
Détente (from the French for “relaxation”) was not friendship but a pragmatic strategy to manage rivalry.
Key Features of Détente
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
The SALT talks were central to Détente’s focus on arms control:
SALT I (1969–1972): Negotiations produced the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and an Interim Agreement limiting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev sign the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement during the 1972 Moscow Summit, demonstrating the practical outcomes of SALT I and the spirit of Détente. Source
SALT II (1972–1979): Aimed to establish further limitations on strategic nuclear delivery systems but was never fully ratified due to later tensions, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
These agreements demonstrated a mutual recognition of the dangers of an unchecked arms race and represented a first step toward stabilising nuclear competition.
Arms Race: A competitive build-up of weapons between rival powers, seeking strategic advantage or deterrence.
The SALT process helped institutionalise verification measures and built channels for ongoing dialogue.
Ostpolitik
Ostpolitik was the policy of West German Chancellor Willy Brandt to normalise relations with Eastern Europe and the German Democratic Republic (GDR):
It aimed to recognise post-war borders, particularly the Oder–Neisse line with Poland.
Brandt’s treaties with the USSR and Poland in 1970, and the Basic Treaty with the GDR in 1972, reduced tensions and improved East–West German communication.
Ostpolitik facilitated the later Helsinki Accords (1975), which promoted human rights and furthered European cooperation.
Ostpolitik: West Germany’s policy of improving relations with Eastern bloc states through negotiation and recognition of existing frontiers.
This approach strengthened Western influence in Eastern Europe while signalling a European desire for peace beyond superpower rivalry.
The Brezhnev Doctrine
In contrast to the spirit of Détente, the Brezhnev Doctrine reaffirmed the USSR’s hard-line stance:
First articulated after the suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968, it declared that once a country became socialist, it could not leave the Warsaw Pact or renounce communism.
Map of Europe c.1973 indicating NATO and the Warsaw Pact, clarifying the spatial context in which the Brezhnev Doctrine operated. Source
The Soviet Union claimed the right to intervene militarily to preserve socialism wherever it was threatened.
This policy justified Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia (1968) and later interventions in Afghanistan (1979).
Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet foreign policy asserting the right to use force to maintain communist rule in any socialist state.
While the doctrine appeared to contradict Détente, it highlighted Moscow’s determination to maintain control over its Eastern European satellites.
Interactions Between Détente and the Brezhnev Doctrine
The coexistence of cooperation and repression defined the era:
Western leaders recognised that arms control and trade agreements could proceed even as the USSR crushed internal dissent in its bloc.
The Helsinki Final Act (1975), with its human rights provisions, created pressure on Eastern European regimes, though enforcement remained limited.
Brezhnev balanced limited accommodation with the West against uncompromising control in the East.
Achievements and Limits
Achievements of Détente included:
A temporary slowdown in the nuclear arms race.
Expanded diplomatic contacts and economic exchanges.
Greater cultural and scientific cooperation across the Iron Curtain.
However, limitations became clear:
Continued ideological competition and regional conflicts, such as in the Middle East and Africa, exposed enduring rivalry.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) marked the effective end of Détente, reviving East–West hostility.
U.S. critics argued that Détente allowed the USSR to consolidate power without real concessions.
Legacy
Despite its collapse, the period of Détente left a framework for dialogue that influenced later negotiations, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) of the 1980s. The Brezhnev Doctrine remained a symbol of Soviet rigidity until repudiated under Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s, paving the way for the eventual dissolution of the Eastern bloc.
This subsubtopic illustrates how the SALT talks, Ostpolitik, and the Brezhnev Doctrine together shaped a complex phase of Cold War history, balancing negotiation with continued ideological conflict.
FAQ
American presidents faced significant public pressure to curb Cold War spending after the Vietnam War.
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger promoted Détente to reduce defence costs and gain strategic stability.
Congress limited funding for further overseas conflicts, reinforcing the drive for arms control agreements like SALT.
Domestic economic concerns, including inflation and oil crises, made cooperative foreign policy more attractive.
Smaller European nations often acted as mediators.
Finland hosted the Helsinki Conference, providing neutral ground for East–West dialogue.
Neutral states such as Austria and Sweden encouraged cultural and scientific exchanges.
These initiatives created pressure for agreements on human rights and economic cooperation that complemented superpower negotiations.
The Kremlin feared that West Germany’s recognition of Eastern borders might encourage ideological infiltration.
Moscow worried that economic links and increased travel could undermine communist authority in the GDR.
Soviet officials nevertheless accepted Ostpolitik because it validated post-war frontiers and brought trade benefits.
Although directed at Eastern Europe, the doctrine alarmed China, already hostile after the Sino-Soviet split.
Beijing feared that the USSR might justify interventions in other socialist countries, including allies of China.
This contributed to closer Sino-American ties during the 1970s, indirectly shaping the global balance during Détente.
Emerging weapons systems challenged treaty definitions.
Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) allowed a single missile to carry several warheads, not fully addressed by SALT I.
Disagreements over counting strategic bombers and cruise missiles created verification issues.
These gaps limited the effectiveness of SALT II and sowed mistrust that resurfaced after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Practice Questions
Question 1 (2 marks)
Identify two key outcomes of the SALT I agreements of 1972.
Mark Scheme
1 mark for each accurate outcome identified, up to a maximum of 2 marks.
Acceptable answers include:
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, limiting defensive missile systems (1 mark).
The Interim Agreement restricting numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs (1 mark).
Credit any equivalent phrasing that clearly describes these specific outcomes
Question 2 (5 marks)
Explain how the Brezhnev Doctrine influenced Soviet actions in Eastern Europe between 1968 and 1980.
Mark Scheme
Level 1 (1–2 marks): Basic description with limited reference to the Brezhnev Doctrine; may mention Soviet control without linking to specific events.
Level 2 (3–4 marks): Clear explanation of the doctrine’s principle that socialist states could not leave the Warsaw Pact, with at least one relevant example such as the 1968 Czechoslovakia intervention or pressure on Poland in 1980.
Level 3 (5 marks): Developed explanation showing how the doctrine justified repeated Soviet interventions or threats (e.g., Czechoslovakia 1968, influence in Poland 1980–81) and maintained Eastern bloc unity, explicitly connecting these actions to the stated policy.
