Hitler’s foreign policy between 1935 and 1939 dramatically reshaped Europe, aggressively dismantling the Versailles system and setting the stage for the Second World War.
Hitler’s Aims
Destruction of the Versailles Settlement
Hitler viewed the Treaty of Versailles (1919) as a humiliating diktat imposed on Germany. His objectives included:
Overturning territorial losses imposed by Versailles, such as regaining the Saarland and the Rhineland.
Abolishing military restrictions: Versailles limited Germany’s army to 100,000 troops, banned conscription, and prohibited heavy weaponry and an air force.
Ending reparations and the war guilt clause, which labelled Germany solely responsible for WWI and justified punitive measures.
By rejecting Versailles, Hitler aimed to restore Germany’s national pride and reassert its status as a major European power.
Lebensraum (Living Space)
Central to Hitler’s ideology was the concept of Lebensraum, the belief that Germany needed to expand eastwards for additional territory to support its growing population and secure resources. This expansionist aim targeted Eastern Europe and the USSR:
It justified plans for conquest in Poland and the Soviet Union.
It was intertwined with a belief in the racial superiority of Germans and the inferiority of Slavs, who were to be displaced or subjugated.
Anti-Communism
Hitler’s fierce anti-communism shaped his domestic and foreign policies:
He saw Bolshevism as a Jewish conspiracy and a direct threat to Aryan supremacy.
Destroying the Soviet Union was essential both to gain Lebensraum and to eradicate communism as an ideology.
This stance resonated with conservative elites and gained support from Western powers that also feared Soviet influence.
German Dominance in Europe
Ultimately, Hitler aimed to establish German hegemony over Europe:
Germany would dominate economically and militarily.
Other states would either align with or submit to German leadership.
This vision echoed earlier imperial ambitions but with a radical racial and ideological component.
Actions Taken: Steps Towards Expansion
Reoccupation of the Rhineland (1936)
On 7 March 1936, Hitler sent German troops into the demilitarised Rhineland, violating both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties (1925).
Context: France and the USSR had just signed a mutual assistance pact, which Hitler claimed threatened Germany.
Execution: German forces were lightly armed and had orders to retreat if challenged.
Outcome: France, politically divided and without British support, failed to respond. This emboldened Hitler and undermined collective security.
Anschluss with Austria (1938)
The Anschluss merged Austria with Germany on 12 March 1938, again defying Versailles and the Treaty of St Germain.
Motives: Hitler, himself Austrian-born, sought to unite all German-speaking peoples.
Events: Under pressure and intimidation, Austrian Chancellor Schuschnigg planned a plebiscite. Hitler demanded its cancellation and the resignation of Schuschnigg.
German Troops: Invited in to “restore order”, they met little resistance.
Result: The Anschluss was popular in both Austria and Germany; Britain and France issued protests but took no concrete action.
Sudetenland and the Munich Agreement (1938)
Hitler’s next target was Czechoslovakia, particularly the Sudetenland, home to a significant ethnic German population.
Sudeten Crisis: Hitler, alongside Sudeten German leader Konrad Henlein, orchestrated unrest, demanding autonomy and then annexation.
Munich Conference: In September 1938, Britain’s Neville Chamberlain and France’s Édouard Daladier, desperate to avoid war, met Hitler and Mussolini.
Agreement: On 30 September 1938, they agreed to cede the Sudetenland to Germany without consulting Czechoslovakia.
Aftermath: Hitler promised this was his last territorial claim in Europe — a promise he broke within months by occupying the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.
German Military Preparation, Propaganda, and Diplomacy
Military Preparation
Hitler’s foreign policy depended heavily on rearmament and modernisation of the military:
Reintroduction of conscription in 1935, increasing the army’s size.
Creation of the Luftwaffe (air force) and expansion of the navy (Kriegsmarine).
Rearmament Programme: Boosted heavy industry and employment, while also intimidating neighbouring countries.
While Germany was not yet ready for full-scale war in the mid-1930s, Hitler gambled on opponents’ reluctance to act.
Propaganda
Propaganda under Joseph Goebbels was vital in preparing the German public and justifying aggressive moves:
Glorified rearmament and territorial gains as restoration of national pride.
Demonised opponents, labelling Czechs and others as oppressors of ethnic Germans.
Celebrated leaders like Hitler as protectors of all Germans, fostering mass support for expansionist policies.
Diplomacy
Hitler used skilful diplomacy to divide potential enemies and buy time:
Non-aggression pacts: For example, the 1934 German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact reassured Poland temporarily.
Bilateral agreements: He engaged Britain and France with promises of peace while secretly planning further conquests.
Manipulation of crises: Orchestrated local disputes and presented Germany as a victim, providing a pretext for intervention.
Response of Western Democracies and Effectiveness of Appeasement
Western Democracies’ Policies
The main Western democracies, Britain and France, followed a policy of appeasement during Hitler’s early aggressions.
Appeasement meant conceding to Hitler’s demands to avoid conflict, believing grievances (e.g., Versailles terms) were legitimate.
Economic and military unpreparedness after the Great Depression limited willingness to confront Germany.
Public opinion: War-weariness from WWI meant the public largely supported efforts to keep peace.
Key Examples of Appeasement
Rhineland: France did not act alone and Britain viewed Hitler’s move as Germans “walking into their own backyard”.
Anschluss: Britain saw unification with Austria as an expression of national self-determination.
Munich Agreement: Chamberlain infamously returned to Britain proclaiming “peace for our time”, believing Hitler’s assurances.
Effectiveness and Consequences
The policy of appeasement has been widely debated:
Short-term success: It delayed war and bought Britain and France time to rearm.
Long-term failure: It emboldened Hitler, convincing him that the West would not stop him. Each unchallenged success strengthened his position and ambitions.
Encouraged further aggression: The occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 shattered any remaining faith in Hitler’s promises and marked the final failure of appeasement.
Shift Away from Appeasement
By early 1939, Britain and France recognised the futility of further concessions:
They guaranteed Polish independence, signalling a commitment to resist further expansion.
Hitler’s invasion of Poland in September 1939 finally ended appeasement and triggered the Second World War.
Between 1935 and 1939, Hitler’s foreign policy transformed Germany into a dominant European power through calculated defiance, rearmament, and opportunistic diplomacy. The passive responses of the Western democracies through appeasement enabled his aggressive expansion unchecked until the brink of war.
FAQ
Hitler cleverly used plebiscites and manipulated public opinion to lend an air of legitimacy to his aggressive foreign policy and to reduce international backlash. For example, after reoccupying the Rhineland in 1936, he held a plebiscite in which over 98% of voters supposedly supported the remilitarisation, although the results were highly orchestrated and pressured. Similarly, following the Anschluss with Austria in March 1938, a rigged plebiscite was organised where over 99% of Austrians allegedly voted in favour of union with Germany. These votes were staged under heavy Nazi propaganda and intimidation, making dissent nearly impossible. By presenting these outcomes as the will of the people, Hitler weakened the resolve of Britain and France to intervene, as they could claim they were respecting national self-determination. This tactic also bolstered Hitler’s popularity at home, consolidating his power and increasing public enthusiasm for further territorial expansion.
While Hitler was the principal architect of foreign policy, he was supported and influenced by a circle of advisors, military leaders, and diplomats who facilitated and sometimes shaped his actions. Figures such as Joachim von Ribbentrop, appointed Foreign Minister in 1938, played a key role in diplomatic negotiations and spreading Nazi propaganda abroad. The German High Command, including generals like Werner von Blomberg and later Wilhelm Keitel, generally supported rearmament and expansion but sometimes had reservations about Hitler’s risky moves, such as the Rhineland reoccupation when the army was still weak. Many military leaders initially advised caution, fearing premature conflict with France and Britain, but Hitler’s political control and repeated successes silenced most dissent. The Nazi diplomatic corps, though often bypassed by Hitler’s direct involvement, implemented his plans and negotiated pacts that isolated enemies or neutralised threats, enabling his foreign policy ambitions to unfold with minimal resistance until war broke out.
Nazi ideology, rooted in notions of racial hierarchy and anti-Bolshevism, directly determined which territories Hitler prioritised for expansion. The idea of Lebensraum demanded fertile eastern lands for German colonisation, targeting Slavic regions viewed as racially inferior and suitable for displacement or subjugation. This ideological goal laid the groundwork for future invasions of Poland and the USSR. In the 1930s, Hitler first focused on areas with significant ethnic German populations, such as the Saar (reintegrated after a 1935 plebiscite), the Rhineland, Austria, and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia. This strategy served both ideological aims and practical ones: uniting all Volksdeutsche under the Reich justified expansion and was popular domestically. Additionally, Nazi anti-communism ensured the Soviet Union remained a central long-term target, though Hitler tactically avoided conflict with the USSR until he felt Germany was strong enough. Thus, ideological principles shaped both the direction and justification of Hitler’s conquests before 1939.
Hitler astutely exploited the League of Nations’ proven weaknesses and the broader failure of collective security throughout the 1930s. The League had already failed to enforce its authority in earlier crises like Manchuria (1931–33) and Abyssinia (1935–36), exposing its inability to curb aggression by major powers. Hitler observed this impotence and calculated that violations of Versailles or other treaties would not provoke a unified response. For example, when Germany remilitarised the Rhineland, the League could not act independently and member states, chiefly Britain and France, were unwilling to intervene militarily. Similarly, during the Anschluss and Sudeten Crisis, Hitler knew the League lacked real power to stop or reverse these annexations. He also withdrew Germany from the League in 1933, freeing himself from constraints and symbolic accountability. By acting swiftly and presenting each step as a fait accompli, Hitler capitalised on the League’s reliance on collective action, which never materialised in time to stop him.
Germany’s economic recovery under Nazi rule was closely linked to the regime’s foreign policy ambitions. Rearmament stimulated industries like steel, coal, and armaments manufacturing, creating jobs and revitalising the economy, which in turn increased popular support for Hitler. Major rearmament programmes absorbed vast state spending, reducing unemployment dramatically and giving the impression of national strength. Moreover, Germany’s autarkic economic policies aimed to reduce dependence on imports, encouraging territorial expansion to secure raw materials and food supplies. For instance, acquiring Austria and the Sudetenland added valuable resources and industrial capacity. Hitler’s Four-Year Plan, launched in 1936 under Hermann Göring, set explicit targets for self-sufficiency and military readiness, linking economic policy directly to preparation for conflict. In this sense, economic recovery and planning were not isolated domestic achievements but were fundamentally designed to equip Germany for sustained aggression. The intertwining of economic strategy with expansionist aims ensured that economic strength underpinned Hitler’s increasing boldness abroad.
Practice Questions
To what extent was Hitler’s foreign policy responsible for the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939?
Hitler’s foreign policy was central to the outbreak of war due to his clear aims to dismantle Versailles, expand eastwards for Lebensraum, and establish German dominance. Actions such as the remilitarisation of the Rhineland, the Anschluss, and the annexation of the Sudetenland escalated tensions and undermined collective security. His calculated risk-taking and manipulation of appeasement emboldened further aggression. However, the failures of the League of Nations, the weakness of Western democracies, and the policy of appeasement also contributed significantly, creating conditions in which Hitler’s ambitions could ignite a wider conflict.
Explain how the policy of appeasement influenced Hitler’s aggressive expansion between 1935 and 1939.
Appeasement encouraged Hitler’s aggressive expansion by signalling that Britain and France would not confront him militarily. When Germany remilitarised the Rhineland in 1936, the lack of response convinced Hitler he could push further. The Anschluss in 1938 and the Munich Agreement later that year confirmed that territorial revisionism faced little resistance. Appeasement allowed Germany to grow stronger economically and militarily without facing significant opposition. This emboldened Hitler to break further promises, occupy Czechoslovakia, and make demands on Poland. Ultimately, appeasement failed to deter Hitler and instead facilitated his increasingly bold foreign policy.
