Stalin’s foreign policy shaped the USSR’s relations with Europe and Asia during the interwar years, aiming to balance security and ideological goals.
Stalin’s Early Foreign Policy Priorities
German-Soviet Relations Before 1933
After the Bolshevik Revolution, the USSR found itself isolated diplomatically. The 1922 Treaty of Rapallo with Germany marked a pragmatic partnership between two outcast states — the USSR and Weimar Germany — who were both excluded from the League of Nations. This treaty allowed for economic cooperation and secret military collaboration, with the Soviets providing training grounds for the German army.
Stalin, inheriting this pragmatic approach, prioritised security over exporting revolution during the late 1920s and early 1930s. He recognised that ideological purity could not guarantee Soviet survival in a hostile world, so cautious diplomacy with Germany continued, despite Hitler’s rise.
The 1933 League of Nations Entry
One of Stalin’s key foreign policy shifts was the decision to join the League of Nations in September 1934 (though negotiations began in 1933). This was a radical break from Lenin’s rejection of ‘bourgeois’ institutions. Stalin saw League membership as a means to counteract Nazi Germany’s growing threat and to foster collective security with Western democracies.
By joining the League, the USSR sought:
Legitimacy as a responsible world power.
Alliances to prevent German aggression.
Opportunities to engage with Britain and France diplomatically.
This move marked a clear attempt to align with the status quo powers rather than revolutionary isolationism.
The USSR’s Pacts with France and Czechoslovakia
The Franco-Soviet Pact (1935)
In May 1935, the USSR signed a Mutual Assistance Pact with France. This was a direct response to Hitler’s rearmament of the Rhineland and Germany’s blatant disregard for the Treaty of Versailles.
Key aspects:
Both nations pledged to support each other in the event of a third-party attack.
The pact was symbolic; its military value was limited because practical plans for joint action were never developed.
France’s reluctance and fear of communism hindered meaningful cooperation.
Despite its weaknesses, the pact showed Stalin’s commitment to building a collective security system in Europe.
The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact (1935)
Following the agreement with France, the USSR secured a similar pact with Czechoslovakia in June 1935. The pact was conditional: Soviet aid would only be provided if France acted first. This cautious wording reflected the mutual mistrust among all parties.
Both pacts aimed to deter Germany by signalling a possible two-front threat, though their effectiveness was questionable. They were more a political warning than a realistic military deterrent.
Soviet Response to International Crises
The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939)
The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War tested the USSR’s commitment to supporting leftist movements abroad.
Soviet involvement:
The USSR sent arms, advisors, and volunteers to help the Republican government fight Franco’s fascists.
The aid came with strings attached: Stalin used it to exert control over Spanish communists and eliminate rivals like Trotskyists and anarchists.
Propaganda promoted the image of the USSR as the defender of democracy against fascism.
However, Stalin’s primary concern was not an outright victory but a prolonged conflict to drain German and Italian resources. The civil war also exposed the West’s reluctance to confront fascism — Britain and France pursued non-intervention, leaving the USSR increasingly suspicious of their resolve.
Japanese Aggression in Manchuria
In the Far East, Stalin faced a threat from Imperial Japan. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria and established the puppet state of Manchukuo.
Soviet actions:
The USSR fortified its borders and built up the Far Eastern army.
Skirmishes occurred along the Manchurian border, notably the Battle of Lake Khasan (1938) and the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (1939).
The decisive Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol under General Zhukov demonstrated Soviet military strength and deterred further Japanese advances into Siberia.
These conflicts shaped Stalin’s strategy: he sought to avoid a two-front war by securing his eastern border, freeing him to focus on European threats.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939
Motivations Behind the Pact
By 1939, Stalin had grown disillusioned with the West’s commitment to collective security. The Munich Agreement of 1938, which ceded the Sudetenland to Hitler without consulting the USSR, convinced Stalin that Britain and France might appease Hitler at the Soviet Union’s expense.
Faced with:
The failure of the Franco-Soviet alliance to deter Germany,
The threat of being dragged into war without Western support,
The desire to regain territory lost after World War I,
Stalin sought a direct arrangement with Hitler to protect Soviet interests.
Terms of the Nazi-Soviet Pact
On 23 August 1939, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, also known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.
Key provisions:
Both nations agreed not to attack each other for ten years.
Secret protocols divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence:
Poland would be partitioned between Germany and the USSR.
The USSR gained freedom to assert control over Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and parts of Romania (Bessarabia).
This agreement stunned the world, as Nazi Germany and the communist USSR were ideological enemies. Stalin calculated that this pact would:
Delay war with Germany, buying time to strengthen Soviet defences.
Allow territorial expansion westward to create a buffer zone against future invasions.
Consequences for Eastern Europe
The pact had immediate and far-reaching impacts:
On 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland from the west; the USSR invaded from the east on 17 September.
Eastern Poland was annexed into the USSR, along with the Baltic states and parts of Romania in 1940.
The agreement facilitated the start of World War II, undermining collective security and leaving Britain and France diplomatically isolated.
For Stalin, the short-term gains seemed worthwhile, but the pact ultimately set the stage for Germany’s betrayal in 1941 when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, invading the Soviet Union.
Soviet foreign policy in the 1930s evolved from a hesitant embrace of collective security to stark realpolitik. Stalin’s willingness to engage both Western democracies and fascist dictatorships reflected a priority for Soviet survival and territorial expansion over ideological consistency. These choices shaped Europe’s descent into the Second World War and defined the USSR’s global role for decades to come.
FAQ
During the 1930s, the Soviet Union’s relationship with Britain fluctuated between cautious engagement and deep mistrust. Initially, Stalin hoped to build a collective security alliance with Britain to counterbalance Nazi Germany’s aggression. Britain’s hesitant attitude towards working with a communist regime, however, weakened this effort. The USSR’s entry into the League of Nations in 1934 was partly aimed at encouraging Britain to view the USSR as a legitimate ally. Nevertheless, events like the Anglo-German Naval Agreement (1935) and Britain’s policy of appeasement, notably during the Munich Conference of 1938, reinforced Stalin’s belief that Britain might negotiate with Hitler at the USSR’s expense. British reluctance to commit troops or sign binding military agreements left the Soviets isolated. By 1939, talks between Britain, France, and the USSR to create an anti-Hitler alliance collapsed due to mutual suspicions and Britain’s preference for diplomacy over confrontation. This failure pushed Stalin towards the Nazi-Soviet Pact as a more pragmatic option for securing Soviet interests.
Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs from 1930 to 1939, was instrumental in pursuing a policy of collective security. A skilled diplomat and fluent English speaker, Litvinov championed closer ties with Western democracies, advocating for Soviet entry into the League of Nations and negotiating pacts with France and Czechoslovakia. He was a vocal opponent of fascism and believed that alignment with Britain and France could deter Hitler’s ambitions. Litvinov’s efforts laid the groundwork for the Franco-Soviet Pact of 1935 and supported aid to Republican Spain during the Civil War. However, his faith in collective security clashed with Stalin’s growing scepticism towards the West’s commitment. As tensions with Germany rose, Stalin replaced Litvinov with Vyacheslav Molotov in May 1939, signalling a decisive policy shift towards direct negotiation with Hitler. Litvinov’s removal cleared the path for the Nazi-Soviet Pact, reflecting Stalin’s pragmatic abandonment of Litvinov’s collective security vision in favour of realpolitik.
In the 1930s, Soviet policy towards the Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, evolved from cautious diplomacy to outright annexation. Initially, the USSR maintained a policy of non-interference, respecting their independence after the Treaty of Tartu (1920). However, with the rise of Nazi Germany, the strategic value of the Baltic region increased dramatically. The secret protocols of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 assigned these states to the Soviet sphere of influence. Following the division of Poland, Stalin pressured the Baltic governments to sign Mutual Assistance Pacts, allowing Soviet troops to be stationed on their soil. In 1940, exploiting the distraction of the ongoing war in Western Europe, the USSR orchestrated political crises, installed pro-Soviet regimes through rigged elections, and formally annexed the Baltic States into the Soviet Union. This expansion created a crucial buffer zone against Germany but sowed deep resentment among the Baltic peoples, contributing to fierce resistance movements during and after World War II.
The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, signed in April 1941, was pivotal in securing Stalin’s eastern frontier at a critical moment. After years of border clashes in Manchuria and Mongolia, culminating in the decisive Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, both powers sought to avoid further conflict. The pact guaranteed that Japan would not attack the USSR while it dealt with European threats, and vice versa. This arrangement allowed Stalin to redeploy substantial Red Army divisions from Siberia to the western front when Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941. These fresh, experienced troops were instrumental in halting the German advance at Moscow during the winter counter-offensive. The pact also suited Japan’s strategic priorities, freeing it to focus on its expansion in Southeast Asia and the Pacific without fear of Soviet interference. Ultimately, the Neutrality Pact ensured that the USSR would not face a two-front war, giving Stalin a crucial breathing space at a moment of extreme vulnerability.
Soviet propaganda meticulously shaped public perception of Stalin’s foreign policy as wise, protective, and always in the people’s best interest. Joining the League of Nations was portrayed as proof of the USSR’s moral leadership in the fight against fascism. The Franco-Soviet Pact and support for Republican Spain were framed as evidence of the USSR’s commitment to defend oppressed peoples worldwide. When the Nazi-Soviet Pact was signed, the narrative shifted dramatically: propaganda rebranded Nazi Germany as a ‘peace partner’ and justified the pact as a necessary measure to keep the USSR safe from imperialist conspiracies and capitalist warmongers. The annexation of Eastern Poland and the Baltic States was depicted as liberating oppressed Slavic and Baltic workers from reactionary regimes. State-controlled newspapers, films, and posters consistently portrayed Stalin as a master strategist outwitting Western appeasers and fascists alike. Dissenting views were harshly suppressed, ensuring the population largely accepted rapid shifts in foreign policy without open resistance or debate.
Practice Questions
Explain why Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939.
Stalin signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939 primarily to secure Soviet borders and buy time to strengthen the Red Army. Disillusioned by Britain and France’s appeasement of Hitler, especially after the Munich Agreement, Stalin feared the USSR would face Germany alone. The pact allowed the USSR to reclaim territories lost after World War I, creating a strategic buffer zone. By partitioning Poland and gaining influence in the Baltics and Bessarabia, Stalin strengthened Soviet security. Additionally, the pact deflected immediate German aggression eastward, delaying war with Germany until the USSR was better prepared for inevitable conflict.
How successful was Stalin’s foreign policy in ensuring Soviet security before 1941?
Stalin’s foreign policy had mixed success in ensuring Soviet security before 1941. Initially, joining the League of Nations and signing pacts with France and Czechoslovakia aimed to contain Nazi Germany but proved ineffective due to Western reluctance. In the Far East, decisive action against Japan at Khalkhin Gol secured the USSR’s eastern front. The Nazi-Soviet Pact temporarily prevented conflict with Germany and expanded Soviet territory. However, it failed long-term, as Hitler’s betrayal in 1941 exposed the USSR’s vulnerability. Therefore, while short-term security improved, Stalin’s policies ultimately did not prevent the devastating German invasion.
