This section explores China’s economic transformation under Mao, examining industrial planning, collectivisation, the Great Leap Forward and the consequences of its dramatic failures.
The First Five-Year Plan (1953–1957)
Soviet Influence and Ideological Foundations
After the founding of the PRC in 1949, the Communist leadership, lacking domestic industrial expertise, turned to the Soviet Union for guidance. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship (1950) secured loans, technical experts, and blueprints for industrial development. Soviet influence was evident in the heavy focus on state-controlled planning, modelled on Stalin’s economic approach.
Industrial Growth Targets
The First Five-Year Plan set ambitious goals to modernise China’s industry and infrastructure. Key targets included:
Rapid expansion of heavy industry: steel, coal, machinery, and power.
Development of transport and communication networks.
Building of new industrial cities and facilities, primarily in the north-east (Manchuria).
Reducing reliance on agricultural exports by producing domestic industrial goods.
The plan aimed to transform China into a self-sufficient socialist state, aligning economic policy closely with Marxist-Leninist ideology.
Outcomes of the First Five-Year Plan
The plan achieved some notable successes:
Industrial output increased dramatically; steel production nearly quadrupled.
Urban employment rose, and new factories and mines were constructed.
Essential infrastructure, such as railways and power stations, expanded significantly.
Economic centralisation tightened the CCP’s control over economic and political life.
However, the emphasis on heavy industry came at the cost of light industry and consumer goods, creating shortages in everyday items. Agricultural output did not keep pace, laying the groundwork for rural strain.
Agricultural Collectivisation
Voluntary Collectivisation (1951–1955)
Initially, the regime encouraged peasants to form Mutual Aid Teams to pool labour and resources. By 1953, this evolved into Lower-stage Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives (APCs) where families shared tools and land but retained private plots.
Participation was nominally voluntary, and incentives included access to machinery and state support. Many peasants cooperated willingly, hoping for modernisation and protection from economic uncertainty.
Enforced Collectivisation (1955–1956)
Disappointed by the slow pace and fearing that private ownership contradicted socialist principles, Mao and the CCP pushed for faster collectivisation. In 1955, Mao announced a nationwide push, resulting in:
Higher-stage APCs, which abolished private plots and consolidated land into larger collective farms.
Significant state coercion; local cadres used propaganda and intimidation to secure compliance.
By the end of 1956, over 90% of peasant households were collectivised.
Though collectivisation aimed to increase efficiency, poor management and resistance often disrupted output.
Establishment of People’s Communes (1958 onwards)
With the launch of the Great Leap Forward (GLF), collectivisation intensified into the creation of People’s Communes, each uniting thousands of households:
Communes combined agricultural production with local industry, schools, and welfare.
Private farming was eliminated; communal dining halls and nurseries replaced family life.
The scale of communes was unprecedented, reflecting Mao’s utopian vision of mass mobilisation.
The commune system drastically altered rural social structures and further detached peasants from direct control of their labour and produce.
The Great Leap Forward (1958–1961)
Ideological Motivations
The GLF was Mao’s radical attempt to catapult China into a communist utopia, bypassing traditional industrialisation stages:
Mao believed mass mobilisation and human willpower could achieve rapid growth without reliance on foreign aid.
The plan rejected over-dependence on experts and bureaucrats, promoting peasant innovation and local initiative.
Mao sought to demonstrate China’s superiority over both Western capitalism and Soviet revisionism.
Restructuring Rural and Industrial Production
Key features included:
Backyard furnaces: Villages built small furnaces to smelt scrap metal, aiming to boost steel output locally.
Expansion of communes to oversee both farming and industrial tasks.
Ambitious projects, like large irrigation schemes, were launched with minimal technical planning.
This radical restructuring blurred the lines between agriculture and industry, placing unrealistic demands on rural communities.
Mao’s Rejection of Expert Advice
Despite warnings from party technocrats and Soviet advisors, Mao dismissed criticism, arguing that political enthusiasm outweighed technical knowledge. Dissenting voices were often labelled as “rightists” or accused of lacking revolutionary zeal. This stifled constructive debate and led to poor policy oversight.
Reasons for the Failure of the Great Leap Forward
Over-Reporting and Unrealistic Targets
Local cadres, under pressure to meet production quotas, routinely exaggerated figures. This led to:
The state requisitioning more grain than villages could spare, causing severe shortages.
Illusory steel targets met by producing unusable scrap metal in backyard furnaces.
False reporting made it impossible for central planners to assess actual conditions.
Administrative Chaos
The rapid restructuring of the rural economy and constant policy shifts created disorganisation:
Resources were misallocated between agriculture and ill-conceived industrial schemes.
Poor weather and ill-managed irrigation projects worsened crop failures.
Communal kitchens encouraged overconsumption, exhausting grain stores faster.
These factors, combined with local resistance and lack of incentives for peasants, crippled agricultural productivity.
Resistance and Famine
Peasants sometimes hid grain or abandoned communal work. Widespread famine ensued between 1959 and 1961, with estimates of 15 to 45 million deaths. Regions like Henan and Sichuan were particularly devastated. The tragedy exposed the catastrophic flaws of the GLF’s methods and Mao’s overreliance on ideology over practical planning.
The Purge of Peng Dehuai and Policy Debates
Peng Dehuai’s Criticism
In 1959, at the Lushan Conference, Defence Minister Peng Dehuai openly criticised the GLF, highlighting food shortages and inflated reports. He argued that the plan’s failings stemmed from unrealistic targets and poor execution, calling for more moderate policies.
Mao’s Response and Peng’s Downfall
Mao perceived Peng’s critique as a personal betrayal and a threat to his authority:
Peng was denounced as a “right opportunist” and accused of conspiring with foreign powers.
He was stripped of his position and replaced by the more compliant Lin Biao.
Other officials who supported Peng’s views faced similar purges, silencing dissent within the party.
Policy Reassessment
Despite Mao’s continued influence, pragmatic leaders like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping gradually took charge of economic recovery:
Communes were reduced in size, and peasants regained some individual farming rights.
Production quotas were lowered to realistic levels.
Foreign aid and grain imports were quietly resumed.
Although Mao never admitted fault publicly, the disastrous impact of the GLF led to a temporary retreat from radical economic experiments until the Cultural Revolution reignited ideological zeal.
These developments illustrate how Mao’s drive for rapid transformation, fuelled by ideological fervour and rejection of expert caution, resulted in one of modern history’s most devastating policy failures. The lessons of the GLF would shape debates within the CCP for decades to come.
FAQ
When People’s Communes were first introduced during the Great Leap Forward, the reactions of China’s rural population were mixed but generally cautious. Many peasants, particularly poorer households, were initially hopeful, seeing the communes as a means to access shared resources, guaranteed meals, and social services like childcare and healthcare. Communal dining halls and canteens were welcomed by some who struggled to afford food individually. However, wealthier peasants and those who had benefited under earlier collectivisation phases often felt resentful about losing what little private land or livestock they still possessed. Resistance was not always overt but could include deliberate work slowdowns or secret hoarding of grain. As time passed, enthusiasm waned rapidly. The promises of abundant food and lightened workloads proved hollow as communal kitchens ran out of grain, and work quotas became relentless. Many peasants resented the intrusion into family life and traditional practices. Consequently, initial acceptance turned into widespread disillusionment, secrecy, and, in some areas, outright defiance.
Local Communist Party cadres were instrumental in executing the ambitious plans of the Great Leap Forward at the village and commune levels. Their role extended beyond administrative duties; they were responsible for motivating peasants, enforcing policies, and reporting production figures to higher authorities. Cadres were expected to demonstrate unwavering loyalty to Maoist ideology and to encourage enthusiasm among the masses, often using propaganda campaigns and public meetings to mobilise support. However, the pressure to deliver results frequently led them to manipulate statistics, overstate grain output, and hide failures. This misinformation misled central planners, who then requisitioned excessive grain quotas, exacerbating famine conditions. Cadres also organised the construction of backyard furnaces, often coercing villagers to donate household metal goods, including essential tools, which harmed agricultural productivity. In many areas, cadres used intimidation and punishment to suppress complaints and resistance, creating an atmosphere of fear. While some cadres genuinely believed in the vision, many acted opportunistically to protect their positions, highlighting the dangerous consequences of combining political zeal with rigid hierarchy and unrealistic targets.
The impact of the Great Leap Forward on urban areas differed significantly from its devastating consequences in the countryside. Urban centres initially benefited from increased employment opportunities due to the expansion of heavy industry and construction projects under the First Five-Year Plan and the early phase of the Leap. Many rural migrants flocked to cities seeking work in new factories and steel plants. Urban residents generally experienced better access to food rationing systems than rural peasants, thanks to state-controlled supply chains prioritising cities. However, urban areas were not immune to the plan’s inefficiencies. Many industrial outputs, especially from backyard furnaces, were of such poor quality that factories could not use them, leading to wasted labour and resources. Food shortages eventually affected cities too, as the rural grain crisis intensified and rationing failed to keep pace with demand. In response, urban authorities sometimes dispatched workers back to villages to assist with agricultural labour during emergencies. Despite hardships, urban populations did not endure the same catastrophic famine mortality seen in rural provinces, revealing the regime’s prioritisation of industrial workers over peasant farmers. This urban-rural divide contributed to deep social tensions that persisted long after the Leap ended.
The Great Leap Forward significantly strained China’s relationship with the Soviet Union, despite their earlier close alliance. Initially, the Soviet Union had supported China’s industrialisation through loans, technical experts, and the sharing of planning models, which shaped the First Five-Year Plan. However, by the late 1950s, Mao’s increasingly radical economic experiments, such as the backyard furnace campaign and massive communes, diverged sharply from the more technocratic and cautious Soviet approach. Soviet leaders, particularly Nikita Khrushchev, viewed Mao’s rejection of expert advice and his dismissal of technical feasibility with scepticism and frustration. The catastrophic outcomes of the Great Leap Forward, including famine and economic chaos, further embarrassed the Soviet leadership, who feared global communist reputation damage. Tensions rose as China grew more assertive in pursuing its ideological line, criticising Soviet “revisionism” and portraying itself as the true guardian of revolutionary purity. By 1960, the Soviets withdrew their advisors and halted technical assistance, deepening the emerging Sino-Soviet Split. Thus, the Leap not only failed domestically but also weakened China’s vital strategic partnership at a time when international isolation posed serious challenges.
The catastrophic failures of the Great Leap Forward deeply reshaped power dynamics within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during the early 1960s. Mao Zedong, while remaining the paramount leader and symbolic figurehead, faced growing criticism from more pragmatic senior officials who recognised the necessity of economic recovery and policy moderation. Leaders such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping emerged as key figures advocating a more realistic approach. They implemented corrective measures like decollectivising some agricultural practices and allowing limited private farming, which gradually revived food production and stabilised rural life. The purge of Peng Dehuai, who bravely confronted Mao’s miscalculations, demonstrated that open dissent remained perilous; however, it also revealed underlying divisions within the CCP between radical ideologues and practical administrators. For a period, Mao stepped back from direct governance, giving space for technocrats to repair the economy. Nonetheless, Mao resented this shift away from revolutionary fervour and viewed these corrective policies as ideological backsliding. His frustration laid the groundwork for the Cultural Revolution, through which he sought to reassert his dominance by mobilising the masses to purge his perceived rivals within the party. Hence, the Great Leap Forward not only caused immense human suffering but also sowed seeds for future factional conflicts that would profoundly shape China’s political trajectory.
Practice Questions
Explain how Soviet influence shaped the First Five-Year Plan in China.
Soviet influence fundamentally shaped the First Five-Year Plan by providing both the ideological framework and practical support. The Sino-Soviet Treaty secured loans, advisors, and industrial blueprints, directly guiding China’s focus on heavy industry, mirroring Stalin’s model. Soviet engineers supervised the construction of factories and infrastructure, embedding central planning into China’s economy. This alignment ensured rapid industrial expansion but neglected consumer goods and agriculture, causing imbalances. Overall, Soviet assistance was crucial in transforming China’s largely agrarian economy into a state-controlled industrial base, setting the foundation for subsequent, more radical experiments like the Great Leap Forward.
Analyse the main reasons for the failure of the Great Leap Forward.
The Great Leap Forward failed primarily due to Mao’s overambitious targets and the suppression of expert advice. Local cadres exaggerated production figures to meet unrealistic quotas, causing severe grain shortages and widespread famine. The focus on backyard furnaces diverted labour from farms, further undermining food supplies. Administrative chaos, poor planning of irrigation schemes, and communal overconsumption worsened the crisis. Peasant resistance and grain hoarding intensified problems. Additionally, criticism, like Peng Dehuai’s, was brutally silenced, preventing policy correction. These factors combined to turn a utopian vision into one of China’s greatest man-made disasters.
