Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms transformed Soviet politics and society, ultimately contributing to the Cold War’s peaceful resolution and the dissolution of the USSR.
Gorbachev’s Leadership and ‘New Thinking’
Mikhail Gorbachev emerged as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in March 1985, succeeding a series of elderly leaders. His dynamic personality and intellectual openness distinguished him from his predecessors, and he quickly realised that the Soviet Union could not sustain its superpower status without profound reform.
Glasnost and Perestroika
Glasnost (meaning openness) aimed to increase transparency in government institutions and to encourage freedom of information and speech. This policy permitted previously suppressed public debate, exposed corruption, and allowed greater media freedom.
Perestroika (meaning restructuring) was a series of economic and political reforms intended to modernise the stagnant Soviet economy and reduce central planning. It encouraged limited market mechanisms, private enterprise, and decentralisation within the economy.
Together, these reforms weakened the rigid controls of the CPSU, stimulating political pluralism and social activism that eroded the ideological foundations of Soviet communism.
‘New Thinking’ in Foreign Policy
Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ rejected confrontation in favour of cooperation and mutual security. He advocated reducing the arms race and sought to resolve Cold War tensions through dialogue rather than military build-up. This marked a radical departure from previous Soviet leaders’ hardline stance.
Economic Difficulties and Pressures for Reform
By the mid-1980s, the Soviet economy was burdened by:
Low productivity in agriculture and heavy industry.
Overwhelming military expenditure which drained resources from civilian sectors.
Shortages of consumer goods and poor living standards compared to the West.
An ageing industrial base in need of modern technology.
The Afghan War (1979–1989) had been particularly costly and unpopular, exacerbating economic strains and draining both manpower and morale. Gorbachev recognised that without economic revitalisation, the USSR’s global influence and domestic stability could not be maintained.
Key Summits: Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow
Gorbachev’s diplomatic initiative led to a series of historic summits with US presidents Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, fundamentally reshaping East-West relations.
Geneva Summit, 1985
First face-to-face meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev.
Set a new tone of dialogue, with both leaders agreeing that nuclear war must never be fought.
Laid groundwork for further negotiations on arms reductions.
Reykjavik Summit, 1986
Surprising progress as both leaders discussed sweeping cuts in nuclear arsenals.
Talks ultimately collapsed over Reagan’s insistence on continuing the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), dubbed Star Wars.
Despite failure, it demonstrated both sides’ willingness to move towards disarmament.
Washington Summit, 1987
Produced the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, eliminating all land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres.
This was the first treaty to reduce the number of nuclear weapons rather than simply limit their growth.
A major milestone that showed Gorbachev’s genuine commitment to arms control.
Moscow Summit, 1988
Finalised the implementation of the INF Treaty.
Reinforced the ongoing process of arms control and mutual trust.
Signified deepening Soviet-American cooperation.
Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative and Bush’s Diplomacy
Reagan’s SDI, announced in 1983, aimed to develop space-based missile defence systems to protect the US from nuclear attack. The project threatened to neutralise the Soviet nuclear deterrent, pushing the USSR’s outdated economy to keep pace technologically.
Gorbachev recognised that matching SDI spending was unrealistic. Instead, he chose to negotiate arms reductions, making the best of a weaker strategic position.
When George H.W. Bush became president in 1989, he continued Reagan’s policy of engagement but was initially cautious. However, as Eastern Europe rapidly changed, Bush worked closely with Gorbachev to ensure a peaceful transition, especially during German reunification.
Collapse of Soviet Control in Eastern Europe
Gorbachev’s decision to abandon the Brezhnev Doctrine, which had justified Soviet intervention in satellite states to maintain communist regimes, was transformative.
The End of the Brezhnev Doctrine
Gorbachev declared that Eastern European nations were free to determine their own political futures.
Unlike past uprisings (e.g., Prague Spring), reform movements were not met with Soviet tanks.
This non-intervention emboldened reformers and nationalists across the Eastern bloc.
1989 Revolutions
A wave of peaceful revolutions swept through Eastern Europe:
In Poland, the Solidarity movement led to the first partially free elections since WWII.
In Hungary, borders were opened, facilitating the flight of East Germans to the West.
In East Germany, mass protests culminated in the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989.
Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution swiftly removed the communist regime without violence.
These events dismantled the Iron Curtain, ending Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe and demonstrating the profound impact of Gorbachev’s reforms and restraint.
Reunification of Germany
German reunification was negotiated diplomatically:
West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl worked with Gorbachev to address Soviet security concerns.
In October 1990, East and West Germany formally reunited.
The presence of NATO forces on former East German soil was a sensitive point, but Gorbachev accepted assurances that NATO would not expand aggressively eastward.
Final Cold War Developments
Gorbachev’s policies and the momentum of reform had far-reaching consequences for the wider world and ultimately the USSR itself.
Withdrawal from Afghanistan
In 1988, Gorbachev ordered the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, ending a disastrous intervention that had cost tens of thousands of lives and further drained resources.
Changes in Cuba and Nicaragua
Cuba, long dependent on Soviet aid, suffered as Gorbachev cut back support, contributing to its severe economic crisis in the 1990s.
In Nicaragua, Soviet backing for the Sandinista government waned, encouraging a peace settlement that led to democratic elections and a reduction in superpower rivalry in Latin America.
Malta Summit, 1989
In December 1989, President Bush and Gorbachev met at the Malta Summit:
Widely seen as marking the symbolic end of the Cold War.
Both leaders declared that the era of hostility was over.
No formal treaty was signed, but mutual trust and cooperation were clear.
Dissolution of the USSR
Despite his reformist intentions, Gorbachev’s policies unleashed forces he could not control:
Economic hardship worsened due to the chaotic transition and falling oil prices.
Nationalist movements gained strength in Soviet republics like the Baltic states and Ukraine.
In December 1991, facing mounting internal opposition and an attempted coup by hardliners, Gorbachev resigned as President of the USSR.
On 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist, replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and independent republics. The Cold War, which had dominated global politics for nearly half a century, was over.
FAQ
Gorbachev’s personal rapport with Western leaders, especially Ronald Reagan and later George H.W. Bush, was pivotal in shaping both the pace and depth of his domestic and foreign reforms. His willingness to engage openly, hold multiple summits, and allow unprecedented transparency built significant goodwill in the West, which in turn reduced the external threat perception that had long justified high Soviet military spending. This trust allowed Gorbachev to redirect resources towards economic restructuring at home. His genuine belief in mutual security and interdependence encouraged him to adopt bold policies like troop withdrawals and arms reductions without fear of Western exploitation. Western leaders reciprocated by supporting Soviet membership in global economic institutions and providing advice on market reforms, though practical aid was limited. Ultimately, this constructive relationship hastened the USSR’s opening to Western economic ideas, yet also exposed its systemic weaknesses, which accelerated political demands that Gorbachev struggled to control.
Under Gorbachev’s glasnost policy, the Soviet media experienced an unprecedented loosening of censorship, which transformed it into a powerful tool for public discourse and criticism. Newspapers, television, and journals began covering previously taboo subjects such as Stalinist purges, government corruption, environmental disasters like Chernobyl, and social inequalities. This newfound freedom empowered investigative journalists and gave citizens access to information that had been tightly controlled for decades. As a result, public awareness and expectations grew rapidly, fuelling calls for political pluralism, multi-party democracy, and even independence among national minorities. Intellectuals and reformers used the media to challenge hardliners within the Communist Party, shifting the public mood further towards radical change. While glasnost aimed to strengthen socialism by exposing and correcting its flaws, in practice, the flood of revelations deeply discredited the regime and eroded faith in the Communist Party’s legitimacy, contributing to rising dissent and the USSR’s eventual fragmentation.
Earlier Soviet economic reforms, such as Khrushchev’s agricultural initiatives and Kosygin’s economic reforms in the 1960s, aimed to fine-tune central planning rather than fundamentally alter the system. Gorbachev’s perestroika, however, marked a more radical departure. Unlike prior adjustments, perestroika sought to introduce elements of a market economy within the socialist framework. This included legalising limited private ownership, creating cooperatives and small businesses, and granting state enterprises greater autonomy from central ministries. Additionally, Gorbachev encouraged foreign investment through joint ventures with Western companies, hoping to modernise technology and management practices. Unlike previous leaders, he publicly acknowledged the need for deep structural change and openly criticised the inefficiency and corruption embedded in the command economy. However, these reforms were inconsistently applied and poorly managed, resulting in production disruptions, inflation, and shortages that disillusioned the population. Unlike previous piecemeal changes, perestroika’s depth and scope highlighted the systemic incompatibility between planned and market principles.
Gorbachev’s attempt to balance reform with stability placed him in an increasingly impossible position, drawing opposition from all sides. Conservative hardliners within the Communist Party, the military, and the KGB saw glasnost and perestroika as threats to the Soviet system’s core principles and feared that loosening control would unleash chaos and destroy communist rule. They resented the loss of power and the decline of ideological discipline. Meanwhile, liberal reformers and radicals, emboldened by glasnost, felt that Gorbachev’s pace was too cautious and that half-measures failed to address the deep economic crisis or deliver genuine democracy. Many demanded faster liberalisation, true multi-party elections, and independence for republics. Nationalist movements in the Baltic states and elsewhere exploited this gap to push for sovereignty. This dual pressure left Gorbachev isolated: too radical for conservatives yet too moderate for democrats. The failed August 1991 coup attempt by hardliners highlighted this tension and sealed the collapse of his authority.
Gorbachev’s shift towards peaceful coexistence and prioritisation of domestic reform significantly altered the USSR’s support for communist movements and regimes abroad. In Cuba, long reliant on generous Soviet subsidies for oil and food imports, the withdrawal of aid due to economic constraints under perestroika devastated its economy and forced Fidel Castro to adopt limited economic changes. Similarly, in Nicaragua, the Sandinista government found Soviet military and financial support dwindling, which encouraged peace negotiations and free elections. In Africa, Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia was scaled back as Gorbachev aimed to cut costs and avoid entanglement in costly proxy conflicts. His refusal to continue propping up unpopular regimes reflected his ‘new thinking’ that ideological expansion was less important than domestic recovery and global stability. This abandonment of revolutionary solidarity marked a dramatic departure from Brezhnev-era foreign policy and weakened Soviet influence in the developing world, signalling a broader retreat from Cold War confrontation.
Practice Questions
Assess the impact of Gorbachev’s policies on the collapse of Soviet control in Eastern Europe between 1985 and 1991.
Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost, perestroika, and ‘new thinking’ fundamentally weakened the ideological and political grip of the USSR over Eastern Europe. By rejecting the Brezhnev Doctrine, he allowed Eastern bloc nations to pursue reform without fear of Soviet intervention. This emboldened popular movements, leading to peaceful revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and East Germany. His refusal to use force was critical in enabling the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany. Without Gorbachev’s reforms and restraint, the collapse of Soviet influence would likely have been delayed or bloodier.
To what extent did arms control agreements contribute to the end of the Cold War between 1985 and 1991?
Arms control agreements such as the INF Treaty were significant in reducing superpower tensions and fostering trust between the USSR and USA. The summits at Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow demonstrated Gorbachev’s commitment to disarmament, encouraging Western confidence in Soviet intentions. By reducing nuclear arsenals, these treaties removed key threats that sustained the Cold War climate. However, while vital, they worked alongside internal Soviet economic crises and Gorbachev’s domestic reforms, which ultimately undermined communist authority. Therefore, arms control was crucial but not the sole factor in ending the Cold War.
