Britain’s foreign policy between 1951 and 1970 shaped its Cold War alliances, European ambitions, nuclear strategy, and global retreat through decolonisation.
Britain’s Relations with the USA and USSR during the Cold War
The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’
Post-war alignment: After WWII, Britain maintained a close strategic partnership with the United States, often referred to as the ‘special relationship’. This bond was cemented by shared democratic values and Cold War objectives.
Military cooperation: Britain supported the USA during key Cold War confrontations, providing bases for American bombers and sharing intelligence through the UKUSA Agreement.
Economic reliance: British recovery relied on American loans and Marshall Aid, reinforcing dependency.
Suez Crisis strain: The 1956 Suez Crisis severely damaged relations, as the USA, under President Eisenhower, forced Britain to withdraw from Egypt, exposing Britain’s weakened global influence.
Nuclear collaboration: Britain and the USA cooperated on nuclear weapons, formalised through the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement, ensuring continued technological exchange despite occasional disagreements.
Relations with the Soviet Union
Containment policy: Britain aligned with the American policy of containing Soviet expansion in Europe.
Espionage scandals: Incidents like the exposure of the Cambridge Spy Ring (notably Kim Philby) eroded trust and revealed deep Soviet infiltration.
Diplomatic engagement: Despite tensions, Britain maintained embassies and participated in summits such as the Geneva Conference (1954) and attempts at détente in the 1960s.
Nuclear balance: The USSR’s growing arsenal and the arms race intensified Britain’s resolve to maintain its own nuclear deterrent to avoid over-reliance on the US.
Britain’s Position in Europe: EFTA and EEC Applications
Establishing EFTA
Reluctance towards supranationalism: Initially, Britain hesitated to join the European Economic Community (EEC), fearing loss of sovereignty and preferring ties with the Commonwealth and USA.
Creation of EFTA: In 1960, Britain co-founded the European Free Trade Association with other non-EEC countries (e.g., Norway, Sweden, Austria) to promote free trade without political integration.
Attempts to Join the EEC
First application (1961): Under Macmillan, Britain recognised economic stagnation compared to EEC growth and applied for membership.
De Gaulle’s veto: French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed Britain’s entry in 1963, citing Britain’s American ties and lack of European commitment.
Second attempt (1967): Harold Wilson’s Labour government reapplied, but de Gaulle again blocked membership, reinforcing Britain’s outsider status until 1973.
The Nuclear Deterrent Debate
Britain’s Independent Nuclear Capability
Initial development: Britain tested its first atomic bomb in 1952 and later the hydrogen bomb in 1957, aiming to remain a top-tier power.
Economic burden: Developing and maintaining nuclear weapons strained public finances, fuelling domestic debate over necessity and cost.
Debates over Independence and Dependence
American support: Reliance on American Polaris missiles (1962 agreement) highlighted Britain’s dependence, sparking debate over genuine independence.
Political divides: Some argued nuclear weapons were vital for national security and global standing; others, including the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), opposed them on moral and economic grounds.
Public sentiment: Anti-nuclear protests, such as Aldermaston Marches, reflected growing unease within civil society.
Key Events: Korean War, Suez Crisis, and ‘Winds of Change’ Speech
The Korean War (1950–1953)
British involvement: Britain contributed over 90,000 troops alongside American forces under the United Nations command to resist North Korean aggression.
Cold War commitment: Participation demonstrated Britain’s loyalty to containing communism and upholding Western unity.
Domestic impact: The conflict strained military budgets but reaffirmed Britain’s global military role.
The Suez Crisis (1956)
Nationalisation of the Suez Canal: Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal, provoking Britain and France, who feared disruption of oil supplies and loss of prestige.
Anglo-French-Israeli invasion: In secret collusion, Britain and France supported an Israeli attack on Egypt, followed by their own military intervention.
US opposition: President Eisenhower forced Britain to withdraw by threatening economic sanctions, revealing Britain’s dependence on American support.
Aftermath: The crisis marked a dramatic decline in Britain’s imperial power and reputation, accelerating the shift towards decolonisation.
The ‘Winds of Change’ Speech (1960)
Harold Macmillan’s speech: Delivered in Cape Town, South Africa, Macmillan acknowledged rising African nationalism, signalling a policy shift towards managed decolonisation.
Significance: It recognised that resisting independence movements was futile and counterproductive during the Cold War, where alienating emerging nations risked pushing them towards Soviet influence.
Britain’s Decolonisation Strategy and Global Retreat
Post-War Economic Constraints
Cost of empire: Maintaining colonies became economically unsustainable amid post-war recovery and domestic welfare commitments.
Pressure from USA and UN: American anti-colonialism and the United Nations’ endorsement of self-determination placed moral and diplomatic pressure on Britain to grant independence.
Gradual Withdrawal from Empire
Africa: Independence was granted relatively peacefully to colonies such as Ghana (1957), Nigeria (1960), and Kenya (1963), although some, like Kenya, saw violent conflict (Mau Mau Uprising).
Asia: Malaya gained independence in 1957; the failure to hold on to India in 1947 had already set a precedent for withdrawal.
Caribbean: Territories such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago became independent in the early 1960s.
Strategic and Political Considerations
Avoiding violent conflict: Britain aimed to transfer power to moderate nationalist leaders to prevent radicalisation and instability.
Cold War context: Granting independence sought to prevent Soviet exploitation of anti-colonial sentiments.
‘East of Suez’ retreat: By the late 1960s, the Labour government announced Britain’s military withdrawal from major bases ‘East of Suez’ (e.g., Aden, Singapore) to cut costs and reflect declining global capacity.
Legacy of Decolonisation
Commonwealth ties: Former colonies often retained links through the Commonwealth, preserving trade and diplomatic relations.
Impact on status: Decolonisation symbolised Britain’s transformation from global imperial power to a mid-ranking state, increasingly reliant on the USA and European partnerships.
Between 1951 and 1970, Britain’s foreign policy and decolonisation reflected a pragmatic adjustment to new realities: declining imperial power, economic constraints, and the Cold War’s ideological battlegrounds. This period set the stage for Britain’s eventual entry into the EEC and a redefined international role.
FAQ
Britain’s decolonisation significantly transformed its relationship with former colonies, leading to the evolution of the modern Commonwealth. As Britain granted independence, it encouraged new nations to remain within the Commonwealth framework to maintain economic, cultural, and diplomatic ties. This helped Britain retain influence and favourable trade links even as direct imperial rule ended. The Commonwealth provided a forum for dialogue, development aid, and shared political values like democracy and human rights, although these ideals were not always consistently applied. For many ex-colonies, membership offered continued access to British markets and technical assistance. Additionally, the Queen remained Head of the Commonwealth, symbolising a shared heritage despite political independence. While some critics argued the Commonwealth was a relic with little power, it nonetheless softened the abruptness of empire’s end. Events such as the Commonwealth Games and Heads of Government Meetings reinforced a sense of ongoing connection, giving Britain a continued, though limited, global voice.
Britain’s post-war economic difficulties were a decisive factor in its decision to pursue rapid decolonisation. After WWII, the country faced massive debts, infrastructure damage, and the costly creation of the welfare state. Maintaining a vast overseas empire required substantial military spending, administration, and investments in colonial development, resources Britain could ill afford while rebuilding domestically. Balance of payments crises and the strain of defending far-flung territories, like Malaya and Kenya, made empire increasingly unsustainable. Economic planners and politicians realised that prioritising trade with Europe and the USA promised more reliable prosperity than clinging to expensive colonies. Moreover, by granting independence, Britain could still preserve commercial relationships without bearing the direct costs of governance and defence. This economic pragmatism dovetailed with mounting anti-colonial resistance and international pressure. Ultimately, financial imperatives ensured that empire was no longer viable, pushing Britain towards a policy of managed withdrawal, securing trade interests while reducing fiscal burdens.
The ‘special relationship’ with the USA, while central to Britain’s Cold War strategy, attracted criticism for fostering a sense of subservience. Critics argued that Britain appeared overly reliant on American military and economic power, especially after events like the Suez Crisis exposed its inability to act independently without American consent. This perceived junior partner status grated on national pride and raised concerns about sovereignty in foreign policy decisions. During nuclear weapons negotiations, some felt Britain sacrificed autonomy by depending on American technology and delivery systems, undermining claims of an independent deterrent. Moreover, American cultural influence and economic dominance sometimes fuelled anti-American sentiment among sections of the public and politicians on the left. Debates in Parliament and the media reflected fears that Britain’s foreign policy interests might be compromised to align with Washington’s global agenda, particularly during conflicts like Vietnam, which Britain avoided but found diplomatically awkward. Thus, the relationship, while strategically beneficial, provoked persistent debate about Britain’s true independence.
Public opinion played an increasingly influential role in shaping foreign policy and nuclear debates between 1951 and 1970. After the devastation of WWII and amid Cold War fears, many Britons initially accepted nuclear weapons as necessary for security and status. However, by the late 1950s, growing awareness of nuclear risks sparked a robust peace movement. The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), founded in 1958, organised large demonstrations, including the well-known Aldermaston Marches, demanding unilateral disarmament. These protests gained significant media attention and attracted support from influential intellectuals, church leaders, and sections of the Labour Party. Public unease pressured politicians to justify nuclear spending and to negotiate arms control agreements. It also influenced election debates, with disarmament becoming a clear dividing line between left and right. Though the government maintained the deterrent, the vocal opposition ensured that nuclear weapons remained a contested and high-profile issue, demonstrating the growing power of grassroots activism in Cold War Britain.
Britain’s commitment to NATO and alignment with the United States shaped its global military obligations throughout the Cold War. As a key NATO member, Britain pledged to contribute significantly to the defence of Western Europe against potential Soviet aggression, maintaining large conventional forces stationed in West Germany under the British Army of the Rhine. Beyond Europe, Britain participated in collective security operations, such as the Korean War, demonstrating a willingness to fight communism globally. This commitment strained resources, compelling the government to balance traditional imperial garrisons with NATO obligations. During the 1960s, economic constraints forced reassessment of overseas deployments, culminating in the ‘East of Suez’ withdrawal policy. Britain decided to pull back from bases in places like Aden, the Persian Gulf, and Singapore, focusing instead on European defence and nuclear deterrence. These shifts reflected a strategic pivot recognising that sustaining a global military presence was incompatible with economic realities and Britain’s new, more limited international role within the Western alliance system.
Practice Questions
Assess the impact of the Suez Crisis of 1956 on Britain’s global position.
The Suez Crisis dramatically exposed Britain’s declining status as a world power. Despite military intervention with France and Israel, Britain was forced to withdraw under intense American economic pressure, revealing its dependence on the USA. Internationally, it damaged Britain’s reputation, undermined its influence in the Middle East, and hastened decolonisation as imperial control seemed untenable. Domestically, it eroded trust in government leadership and demonstrated Britain could no longer act unilaterally. Overall, the crisis symbolised the end of Britain’s imperial dominance and forced a reorientation towards Europe and closer ties with the United States.
Explain why Britain’s attempts to join the EEC in the 1960s failed.
Britain’s initial reluctance to join the EEC delayed its applications until economic stagnation made membership attractive. Macmillan’s 1961 application and Wilson’s 1967 attempt both failed primarily due to French President Charles de Gaulle’s veto. De Gaulle distrusted Britain’s close ties with the United States, fearing it would act as an American Trojan horse within Europe. Additionally, he doubted Britain’s economic stability and commitment to European integration. Britain’s prior focus on the Commonwealth and EFTA further fuelled French suspicions. Consequently, repeated rejection left Britain isolated until its successful entry in 1973 after de Gaulle’s resignation.
