Between 1926 and 1936, Mussolini pursued an ambitious foreign policy to build prestige, expand Italian influence, and secure a new Roman Empire.
Mussolini’s Foreign Policy Aims
Prestige and National Glory
Mussolini sought to restore Italy’s status as a great power, aiming to revive the grandeur of the Roman Empire.
He wanted to eliminate Italy’s sense of inferiority compared to Britain and France after WWI and the disappointing gains from the Treaty of Versailles.
Public spectacles, aggressive speeches, and military parades were used to cultivate an image of Italy as dynamic and powerful.
Empire-Building
Mussolini envisioned an Italian empire spanning the Mediterranean (Mare Nostrum – “Our Sea”) and parts of Africa.
Expansion would boost national pride, provide colonies for surplus population, and supply raw materials.
His imperial ambitions were deeply tied to his ideological goal of creating a new, virile Italian race willing to conquer and civilise.
Mediterranean and African Expansion
The Mediterranean was seen as Italy’s natural sphere of influence, with a focus on challenging British and French dominance.
In Africa, Mussolini targeted Abyssinia (modern Ethiopia) to connect existing colonies in Eritrea and Somalia, creating a continuous Italian East Africa.
Early Assertive Moves: Corfu and Albania
Corfu Incident, 1923
Though occurring before the main period, the Corfu Incident set a precedent for Mussolini’s aggressive diplomacy.
In August 1923, after the murder of an Italian general on Greek soil, Mussolini demanded reparations.
When Greece delayed, Italy bombarded and occupied Corfu.
The League of Nations was bypassed; Greece paid an indemnity, and Italy withdrew only after achieving its aims.
This incident boosted Mussolini’s domestic standing and signalled that Italy would use force to resolve disputes.
Albania: Protectorate in the Balkans
Albania was seen as strategically vital to secure Italy’s Adriatic flank and to project influence into the Balkans.
From the mid-1920s, Mussolini extended loans and military support to Albanian leader King Zog.
By 1926, the Treaty of Tirana formally made Albania an Italian protectorate.
Italy gained control over Albanian foreign and military policy, tightening its grip through subsequent treaties.
Albania served as a forward base for Italian interests in southeastern Europe.
The Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935–1936
Motivations for Conquest
Ethiopia (Abyssinia) was one of the few independent African states and a long-standing Italian target.
In 1896, Italy suffered a humiliating defeat at Adwa, which Mussolini wanted to avenge.
Conquest would demonstrate Italy’s power, distract from domestic economic issues, and fulfil imperial dreams.
Course of the War
In October 1935, Mussolini launched an invasion from Eritrea and Somaliland.
The Italian army, equipped with modern weapons, used brutal tactics, including chemical warfare, against poorly armed Ethiopian forces.
Addis Ababa fell in May 1936, and King Haile Selassie fled into exile.
Italy declared victory and established Italian East Africa, merging Ethiopia with Eritrea and Somaliland.
International Response and Isolation
The invasion violated the League of Nations Covenant.
Britain and France, initially keen to appease Mussolini to keep him from aligning with Germany, imposed limited economic sanctions.
The Hoare-Laval Pact (a secret Anglo-French plan to partition Ethiopia) failed due to public backlash.
Sanctions were half-hearted and did not include oil, limiting their effect.
The conflict severely damaged Italy’s relations with Britain and France, pushing Mussolini closer to Hitler’s Germany.
Diplomacy with Britain and France
Early Diplomatic Engagement
Mussolini initially maintained friendly relations with Britain and France to secure recognition of Italy’s sphere of influence.
Agreements like the Four Power Pact (1933) aimed to coordinate European diplomacy, elevating Italy’s status alongside the major powers.
Changing Relations
Mussolini positioned himself as a bulwark against German expansion, presenting Italy as a stabilising force in Europe.
He supported Austria’s independence to prevent a German Anschluss (annexation).
After the Abyssinian crisis, trust eroded. Britain’s naval presence in the Mediterranean and sanctions deepened Mussolini’s resentment.
Drift Towards Germany
Isolation from Britain and France made Mussolini reassess alliances.
He began to tolerate Hitler’s actions, including the reoccupation of the Rhineland and the undermining of Austrian independence.
By 1936, the groundwork was laid for the Rome-Berlin Axis, formalising closer ties with Nazi Germany.
Assessing the Success and Consequences
Short-Term Gains
Mussolini’s foreign policy initially brought popular acclaim at home.
Victories like Ethiopia’s conquest created an illusion of revived imperial glory.
The regime claimed success in breaking free from the constraints of the League of Nations and the status quo powers.
Economic and Military Strain
The Ethiopian campaign was costly:
It drained Italian finances, worsened the national debt, and exposed Italy’s limited industrial base.
Maintaining and administering a vast colony proved logistically and economically burdensome.
Military resources were stretched thin, and modernisation suffered due to the expense of colonial adventures.
International Isolation
Aggressive moves alienated Britain and France, traditional Mediterranean powers.
Sanctions, though ineffective, demonstrated Italy’s vulnerability to economic pressure.
The breakdown in relations forced Mussolini to find new allies, pushing him towards alignment with Hitler, which would have grave consequences in WWII.
Legacy of Assertiveness
Mussolini’s assertive foreign policy transformed Italy’s international position from a minor power seeking prestige to an isolated state reliant on Germany.
The foreign policy of 1926–1936 laid the groundwork for Italy’s involvement in disastrous conflicts in the coming years.
While it temporarily fulfilled nationalist dreams, the long-term results undermined Italy’s strength and contributed to its downfall in WWII.
Key Points for Revision
Aims: Prestige, empire, Mediterranean dominance.
Key actions: Corfu Incident, Albania protectorate, Italo-Ethiopian War.
Diplomacy: Initially cooperative with Britain and France; isolation post-Ethiopia led to closer ties with Germany.
Consequences: Short-term popularity; long-term economic strain, diplomatic isolation, and alignment with Nazi Germany.
FAQ
Mussolini justified the invasion of Ethiopia using a mix of historical, racial, and economic arguments designed to appeal to national pride and Fascist ideology. He framed it as revenge for Italy’s humiliation at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, portraying the war as the final act to avenge past defeat and restore honour. To the public, Fascist propaganda painted Ethiopia as a backward, barbaric nation in need of civilisation under Italian guidance, resonating with contemporary racist attitudes. Mussolini also argued that expansion into Africa would resolve Italy’s demographic challenges by providing land for settlement and raw materials to fuel economic self-sufficiency, reducing dependence on foreign imports. Internationally, he claimed Italy was merely bringing order and modernity, dismissing Abyssinia’s membership in the League of Nations as ineffective. By appealing to nationalism, racial superiority, and economic necessity, Mussolini successfully rallied public support despite significant financial and human costs associated with the campaign.
Propaganda was central to Mussolini’s strategy to legitimise and glorify his foreign policy ventures. The Fascist regime controlled newspapers, radio broadcasts, cinema, and public events to shape perceptions of Italy’s international standing. Military campaigns, such as the Ethiopian invasion, were depicted as heroic crusades reviving Rome’s imperial glory, reinforcing Mussolini’s image as a bold and decisive leader. Newsreels showed triumphant troops and parades, masking battlefield atrocities and the use of chemical weapons. Foreign policy actions like the Corfu occupation and Albania’s protectorate were exaggerated as strategic masterstrokes proving Italy’s strength and Mussolini’s diplomatic genius. Schools and youth organisations reinforced these narratives by teaching a heroic version of contemporary history, embedding a sense of imperial destiny among the young. Dissenting voices and reports of failures were heavily censored to maintain morale. This comprehensive use of propaganda fostered a national consensus that Italy was reclaiming its rightful status, masking the economic burdens and diplomatic isolation that actually weakened the nation.
The League of Nations responded to Mussolini’s invasion of Ethiopia with condemnation and the imposition of economic sanctions, marking one of its most high-profile challenges before World War II. However, the sanctions were partial and largely ineffective; crucial commodities like oil were excluded to avoid provoking a wider conflict. Britain and France, key League members, hesitated to fully enforce measures that might push Mussolini towards Hitler’s Germany, resulting in a half-hearted application of punitive actions. The secret Hoare-Laval Pact, which proposed to give Italy significant parts of Ethiopia in exchange for peace, undermined the League’s credibility further when it became public and caused scandal. This toothless response exposed the League’s inability to restrain powerful aggressor states, emboldening other dictators like Hitler to pursue expansionist aims unchecked. The failure damaged the League’s authority and reputation irreparably, signalling that collective security could be bypassed if nations acted forcefully enough, setting a dangerous precedent for the late 1930s.
Albania held significant strategic value in Mussolini’s plans for expanding Italian influence in the Balkans and securing dominance over the Adriatic Sea. By turning Albania into a protectorate through diplomatic and financial pressure, Mussolini gained a foothold directly opposite Italy’s southeastern coast, strengthening maritime security and allowing easier military access to the Balkans. It served as a base for projecting power against Yugoslavia and Greece, both of which Mussolini saw as within Italy’s rightful sphere of influence. The move also challenged other regional powers, notably Yugoslavia and Greece, who viewed Italian involvement as destabilising. Domestically, control over Albania fed into Fascist propaganda that Italy was resurrecting its imperial past and extending its civilising mission into Europe, not just Africa. Maintaining a presence in Albania complemented Mussolini’s broader vision of transforming the Mediterranean into Mare Nostrum—“Our Sea”—free from British and French naval dominance. This control laid the groundwork for further Balkan ambitions that would surface later in the late 1930s and early 1940s.
Mussolini’s aggressive foreign policy in the Mediterranean significantly shaped Italy’s naval priorities and broader military planning. Determined to challenge British and French supremacy in the region, Mussolini ordered substantial investment in modernising the Regia Marina (Royal Navy). Emphasis was placed on building new battleships, cruisers, and submarines capable of projecting Italian power across the central and eastern Mediterranean. This naval build-up aimed to ensure control of key sea lanes and protect newly acquired territories like Libya, the Dodecanese Islands, and Albania. However, this ambition strained Italy’s limited industrial and financial resources, leading to mismatched priorities between the navy, army, and air force. The navy often competed with the army for funding, resulting in gaps in readiness, logistics, and technological parity with Britain’s Royal Navy. While propaganda boasted of a powerful fleet, the reality was that Italy’s maritime capabilities remained vulnerable due to outdated infrastructure and supply issues. Thus, Mussolini’s Mediterranean policy heightened military rivalry, exposed resource limitations, and left Italy poorly prepared for sustained naval warfare when global conflict erupted in 1939.
Practice Questions
To what extent did Mussolini achieve his aims in foreign policy between 1926 and 1936?
Mussolini achieved notable short-term gains in prestige and territorial expansion, such as the successful conquest of Ethiopia and the establishment of a protectorate over Albania. These actions boosted his domestic popularity and gave the impression of a resurgent Roman Empire. However, these successes came at a severe economic cost and alienated Britain and France, isolating Italy diplomatically. His assertive policy inadvertently drove Italy closer to Nazi Germany, limiting independent action. Therefore, while Mussolini partially fulfilled his aims of glory and empire, the long-term consequences undermined Italy’s strategic position and security.
Explain why Mussolini’s foreign policy led to increasing international isolation by 1936.
Mussolini’s aggressive expansionism, notably the invasion of Ethiopia, directly violated the League of Nations Covenant and antagonised Britain and France. Initial attempts to cooperate with these powers, like the Four Power Pact, were overshadowed by Italy’s blatant disregard for collective security. The ineffective sanctions imposed exposed Italy’s economic vulnerabilities but failed to deter Mussolini’s ambitions. His disregard for diplomatic norms eroded trust, leaving Italy diplomatically isolated. To counter this isolation, Mussolini began pivoting towards Germany, abandoning his earlier anti-German stance. Thus, reckless imperial adventures and confrontational diplomacy alienated traditional allies and reshaped Italy’s foreign relations.
