The Cultural Revolution began in 1966 to reassert Mao Zedong’s authority, reshape Chinese society, and crush perceived capitalist threats within the Communist Party.
Causes and Ideological Motivations
The Cultural Revolution’s origins lay in Mao Zedong’s determination to revitalise the revolutionary spirit and counteract what he saw as dangerous trends towards pragmatism and revisionism in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
After the Great Leap Forward (GLF): Mao’s disastrous economic policies during the GLF (1958–1962) had significantly damaged his standing. Although he stepped back from daily governance, Mao maintained immense ideological influence and sought to protect his revolutionary legacy.
Concerns about capitalist tendencies: Mao feared that economic pragmatists like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were steering China towards ‘capitalist road’ policies, undermining socialism and class struggle.
Ideological fervour: Mao believed China needed constant revolution to prevent bureaucratic stagnation and bourgeois corruption. He invoked the notion of a continuing revolution to justify radical action against Party elites.
Mao’s goal was to purge rivals, reassert his ideological vision, and reinvigorate the Chinese population, especially its youth, with fervent loyalty to Maoist thought.
The Role of the Shanghai Radicals and the CCRG
A crucial element in orchestrating the Cultural Revolution was the mobilisation of radical supporters who could bypass the Party hierarchy.
Shanghai Radicals: This group of committed leftists, centred in Shanghai, included figures such as Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Wang Hongwen. They were instrumental in promoting ultra-leftist ideology and attacking moderate leaders.
Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG): To coordinate the campaign, Mao replaced the Party’s regular propaganda and cultural departments with the CCRG in May 1966.
The CCRG was led by trusted loyalists like Chen Boda, Jiang Qing (Mao’s wife), and Kang Sheng.
It became the de facto political nerve centre for the movement, directing propaganda, sanctioning attacks on Party officials, and providing ideological guidance.
The CCRG operated independently of traditional Party structures, enhancing Mao’s personal control.
Through these organs, Mao and his allies encouraged a wave of public criticism, wall posters (dazibao), and mass rallies to foster a revolutionary atmosphere.
Internal Party Tensions: Attacks and Purges
The Cultural Revolution unleashed fierce infighting within the CCP, targeting perceived ‘capitalist roaders’ and consolidating Mao’s power.
The Targeting of ‘Capitalist Roaders’
Mao labelled Party leaders who favoured economic pragmatism as ‘capitalist roaders’ who betrayed socialist principles.
Key targets included President Liu Shaoqi and Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping, who had championed moderate economic recovery policies after the GLF.
Propaganda denounced them as enemies of the revolution, creating a climate of fear and suspicion within the Party.
Downfall of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping
Liu Shaoqi:
Once Mao’s designated successor, Liu was publicly vilified, accused of treachery, and stripped of all posts.
He suffered brutal persecution, torture, and died in prison in 1969.
Deng Xiaoping:
Although less harshly treated than Liu initially, Deng was dismissed from his positions and sent into internal exile for ‘rehabilitation through labour’.
Deng’s pragmatic approach would later return to prominence, but during the Cultural Revolution, he was silenced.
These purges demonstrated Mao’s determination to eliminate any challenge to his ideological dominance.
The Role of the Red Guards
One of the most striking aspects of the early Cultural Revolution was the creation and unleashing of the Red Guards, who embodied Mao’s faith in youth as the vanguard of revolution.
Mobilisation of Youth
In May 1966, Mao called on students to ‘bombard the headquarters’, urging them to criticise and overthrow corrupt authority.
Red Guard groups sprang up in schools and universities across China, composed mainly of radicalised teenagers and young adults.
Youths were encouraged to challenge teachers, parents, and local Party officials, rejecting traditional hierarchies.
Attacks on Traditional Authority and Party Officials
The Red Guards:
Attacked the ‘Four Olds’: old customs, culture, habits, and ideas. They destroyed temples, artworks, and books deemed feudal or bourgeois.
Humiliated and persecuted teachers and intellectuals, often through public denunciations and struggle sessions.
Raided homes of suspected ‘counter-revolutionaries’ to confiscate ‘bourgeois’ possessions.
Targeted Party cadres, forcing officials to wear placards confessing alleged crimes and endure physical and psychological abuse.
These violent campaigns sowed chaos but aligned with Mao’s objective of weakening the Party bureaucracy and igniting mass revolutionary zeal.
Military and Political Role of Lin Biao and the PLA
As the Cultural Revolution spiralled, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), under Lin Biao, played an increasingly critical role in sustaining Mao’s revolution and restoring order when necessary.
Lin Biao’s Influence
Lin Biao, a loyal Maoist and Minister of Defence, was elevated as Mao’s chosen successor in 1969.
He championed the widespread distribution of Mao’s ‘Little Red Book’, which became a symbol of the movement and an essential tool for indoctrination.
Lin used his control over the PLA to enforce Mao’s directives and protect the revolution’s radical edge.
PLA’s Dual Function
The PLA’s involvement evolved through two main stages:
Supporting the Red Guards:
Initially, the army provided logistical support for Red Guard travel across China, enabling students to spread revolutionary messages nationwide.
Troops often stood aside as Red Guards dismantled local administrations and persecuted enemies.
Reining in the Chaos:
By late 1967, Red Guard factions began fighting each other and disrupting production.
The PLA intervened to restore stability, occupying rebellious regions and disbanding the most uncontrollable groups.
Military control replaced discredited civilian authorities, marking a shift from revolutionary chaos to military-backed governance.
Lin Biao’s military loyalty was vital for Mao. However, Lin’s power would later arouse Mao’s suspicions, contributing to internal intrigues that culminated in Lin’s mysterious death in 1971 — but this belongs to the later phase of the Cultural Revolution.
Impact and Legacy of the Early Phase
The 1966–1969 phase of the Cultural Revolution had profound consequences for Chinese society and the Communist Party:
Political Power Shift: Mao reasserted undisputed leadership, marginalising pragmatists and dismantling entrenched Party structures.
Social Upheaval: Millions of young Chinese were radicalised, traditional culture suffered devastating blows, and intellectual life was stifled.
Foundation for Further Turmoil: The purges and power vacuum set the stage for continued factional struggles, leading into the next phase of the Cultural Revolution, marked by further military intervention and the rise of the Gang of Four.
The Cultural Revolution’s origins and early phase thus illustrate Mao’s capacity to wield ideology and mass mobilisation as powerful tools of political control — with consequences that reshaped China for decades.
FAQ
Many young people saw themselves as heroic defenders of true socialism during the Cultural Revolution. The official propaganda portrayed them as the vanguard of Mao’s vision, tasked with purging society of bourgeois influences and corrupt officials. This gave them a sense of power and moral purpose that many had never experienced before. Schools and universities became breeding grounds for radicalisation, as students formed Red Guard units, wrote wall posters denouncing teachers, and organised mass rallies. Travel passes issued by the state allowed millions of youths to journey across China, exchanging revolutionary ideas and further fuelling their fervour. For some, this period was an intoxicating break from traditional Confucian respect for elders and hierarchy. They relished the chance to challenge authority openly, often turning on family members seen as counter-revolutionary. However, as violence escalated and factions emerged, disillusionment set in for many. By the late 1960s, students found themselves manipulated by competing interests, their idealism overshadowed by brutal infighting and Party crackdowns.
The early phase of the Cultural Revolution wreaked havoc on China’s education system. Schools and universities were effectively paralysed as teachers and administrators were denounced, publicly humiliated, and sometimes physically assaulted by Red Guards. Academic schedules collapsed because students abandoned classes to participate in revolutionary activities, attend mass rallies in Beijing, or travel to spread Maoist ideology. The curriculum itself was overhauled to focus more on political indoctrination and less on technical or scientific subjects, which hindered the country’s long-term educational development. Many schools closed altogether, while others operated chaotically with little structured teaching. Exams and grades were often abolished, replaced by political loyalty as the main measure of student worth. A generation of students missed formal education during these critical years, resulting in a severe shortage of trained professionals in the 1970s. Even after the Cultural Revolution’s height had passed, rebuilding a functioning and credible education system proved to be a massive challenge for China.
Urban communities experienced profound upheaval during the Cultural Revolution’s initial years. City streets were flooded with Red Guards organising parades, rallies, and attacks against so-called class enemies. Ordinary residents faced constant fear of denunciation, especially those from landlord, bourgeois, or ‘bad element’ backgrounds. Workplaces and neighbourhood committees were turned into arenas for struggle sessions where neighbours were forced to publicly confess alleged crimes. Urban families endured raids on their homes, with Red Guards seizing books, antiques, and religious items considered reactionary. Public transport was overwhelmed as millions of students travelled freely with state-issued rail passes. Factories and offices suffered severe disruptions because production took a back seat to political meetings and purges of managers and technicians. Many experienced downward social mobility if labelled as enemies of the revolution. Additionally, social trust within communities deteriorated as people, including children, were encouraged to report on neighbours or even family members. This atmosphere of suspicion and surveillance left deep scars on urban social fabric.
Mao’s personality cult was central to sustaining the Cultural Revolution’s radicalism. From the early 1960s, propaganda increasingly depicted Mao as the infallible ‘Great Helmsman’, the ultimate authority on Marxist-Leninist thought. His image dominated posters, newspapers, and daily life, creating a quasi-religious reverence. The widespread publication of the ‘Little Red Book’, a compilation of Mao’s quotations, became a symbol of loyalty; Red Guards and ordinary citizens were expected to carry it at all times. The cult elevated Mao above any criticism, giving his calls for ‘continuous revolution’ an unchallengeable moral force. Red Guards, steeped in this hero-worship, believed they were directly fulfilling Mao’s will by attacking perceived enemies. Dissent or moderation was instantly equated with betrayal of the Chairman. This fanatical devotion discouraged questioning and justified extreme actions, including violence and destruction of cultural heritage. The personality cult thus enabled Mao to mobilise the masses, weaken bureaucratic resistance, and maintain political supremacy, even as chaos engulfed the country.
While many Party officials feared the Cultural Revolution, some actively supported it for various reasons. Younger, ambitious cadres saw it as an opportunity to rise through the ranks by demonstrating unwavering loyalty to Mao. They believed aligning with radical factions like the CCRG could help them replace older, more moderate leaders accused of revisionism. Others were genuine ideological believers, convinced that China needed to root out corruption and re-ignite revolutionary fervour to avoid becoming stagnant like the Soviet Union. Supporting the Cultural Revolution also offered protection; opposing it could result in accusations of being a capitalist roader or counter-revolutionary, leading to public humiliation, imprisonment, or worse. In some regions, local officials used revolutionary rhetoric to settle old scores or consolidate power by targeting rivals under the guise of ideological purity. While support often began as self-preservation or opportunism, it sometimes spiralled into complicity in widespread persecution, leaving a complex legacy for officials who survived the movement’s excesses.
Practice Questions
Explain why Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution in 1966.
Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution primarily to reassert his authority after the failures of the Great Leap Forward had weakened his position. He feared the rise of ‘capitalist roaders’ like Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, whose pragmatic economic policies threatened his ideological vision. By mobilising youth through the Red Guards and empowering radical groups like the Cultural Revolution Group, Mao aimed to purge opposition within the Party and revive revolutionary fervour. The movement also allowed him to dismantle entrenched bureaucracies and ensure that his personal interpretation of Marxism-Leninism remained dominant across China.
How important was the role of the Red Guards in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution?
The Red Guards were vital in the early phase of the Cultural Revolution, acting as Mao’s instrument to attack traditional hierarchies and eliminate perceived enemies. Their enthusiastic mobilisation spread revolutionary chaos nationwide, targeting ‘Four Olds’, persecuting intellectuals, and undermining local Party authority. This youth-driven upheaval destabilised existing structures, allowing Mao to bypass Party channels and weaken rivals like Liu Shaoqi. However, their violence eventually spiralled beyond control, necessitating intervention by the PLA. Therefore, while indispensable for Mao’s aims initially, the Red Guards’ excesses highlighted the limits of mass mobilisation as a tool for sustained governance.
