Brezhnev’s foreign policy and the internal challenges he faced shaped the USSR’s trajectory during the 1970s and early 1980s, defining late Cold War tensions.
Détente and the SALT Agreements
The Concept of Détente
Under Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union pursued détente, a policy aimed at reducing tensions with the West, particularly the United States, after years of Cold War hostility.
Détente emerged in the context of nuclear parity, rising military expenditure, and a desire to stabilise the arms race.
It was also motivated by economic pressures; the USSR required Western technology and trade to modernise its stagnant economy.
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
A key feature of détente was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT):
SALT I (1972): This agreement resulted in the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which limited missile defence systems to two sites per country, and an interim agreement that froze the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) each side could deploy.
SALT I symbolised the first meaningful attempt to control the arms race and marked a high point in superpower cooperation.
SALT II (1979): Negotiated under Brezhnev and President Carter, this treaty sought further limits on strategic nuclear launchers and warheads. Although signed, it was never ratified by the US Senate due to worsening relations, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Impact: Détente and SALT stabilised US-Soviet relations temporarily, allowed limited arms control, and facilitated increased cultural and scientific exchanges. However, mistrust persisted, and the underlying rivalry remained unresolved.
The Invasion of Afghanistan and its Effects
Background and Causes
In December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to support the pro-Soviet communist government, which faced internal rebellion and regional instability.
The decision was influenced by fears of an Islamic insurgency spilling over into Soviet Central Asian republics.
Brezhnev and his Politburo misjudged the resistance they would face, believing intervention would be brief and successful.
The Course and Consequences of the War
Soviet troops became bogged down in a brutal conflict against Afghan mujahideen fighters, who were heavily supported by the United States, Pakistan, and other Western allies.
The war drained the Soviet economy, demoralised the military, and revealed the limits of Soviet power.
Impact on International Relations
The invasion marked the end of détente, leading to a new phase of Cold War tension.
In response, the US imposed economic sanctions, boycotted the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and increased defence spending dramatically under President Reagan.
The conflict damaged the USSR’s reputation worldwide, showcasing its inability to maintain control over a smaller neighbouring state.
Internal Dissent and Opposition
Intellectual and Political Dissent
Despite the tight grip of the Communist Party, dissent grew under Brezhnev’s regime:
Andrei Sakharov, a prominent nuclear physicist and human rights activist, criticised Soviet repression and the arms race. He was internally exiled to Gorky in 1980 for his outspoken views.
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Nobel Prize-winning author, exposed Stalinist abuses through works like The Gulag Archipelago. His writings were banned, and he was forcibly expelled from the USSR in 1974.
These figures became global symbols of Soviet dissent and human rights struggles.
Nationalist Unrest
Various non-Russian nationalities increasingly demanded cultural and political rights:
Unrest was visible in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and the Caucasus, where suppressed national identities resurfaced.
Nationalist movements were fuelled by economic disparities, cultural suppression, and resentment against Russification policies.
Protest Movements
While open mass protest was rare due to state surveillance and repression, underground movements spread samizdat (illegal self-published literature) and organised minor demonstrations.
Dissidents documented human rights abuses, coordinated petitions, and drew international attention to Soviet violations, undermining the regime’s global image.
The Helsinki Accords and Growing Discontent
The Helsinki Accords (1975)
Brezhnev’s USSR signed the Helsinki Accords as part of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE):
Western countries recognised the post-WWII European borders, which legitimised Soviet control over Eastern Europe.
In return, the USSR agreed to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Consequences for the Regime
While Brezhnev saw this as a diplomatic victory, the human rights provisions gave dissidents a new tool.
Activists formed Helsinki Watch groups to monitor Soviet compliance, using the Accords to criticise state repression.
The West leveraged these provisions to pressure the USSR, further exposing hypocrisy in the regime’s domestic policies.
Result: The Accords unintentionally encouraged domestic criticism, emboldened dissidents, and intensified scrutiny of Soviet abuses, fuelling both internal and international discontent.
Brief Leaderships of Andropov and Chernenko
Yuri Andropov (1982–1984)
After Brezhnev’s death in 1982, Yuri Andropov, former KGB chief, succeeded him:
He aimed to revive the stagnant Soviet system through modest reforms.
Andropov cracked down on corruption, absenteeism, and alcoholism in an effort to increase productivity.
He encouraged limited openness and tolerated a slight increase in criticism of bureaucratic inefficiency.
His health deteriorated rapidly, and he died after just 15 months in power, limiting his ability to enact significant change.
Konstantin Chernenko (1984–1985)
Following Andropov’s death, Konstantin Chernenko, a staunch Brezhnevite, became General Secretary:
Chernenko was elderly and ill from the start, representing continuity rather than change.
He reversed some of Andropov’s mild liberalisations, favouring stability over reform.
His leadership lacked energy and vision, and no major policies were introduced.
Chernenko’s brief rule highlighted the gerontocracy gripping the Soviet leadership and the urgent need for generational change.
Significance: The short and ineffective tenures of Andropov and Chernenko illustrated the regime’s deep-rooted sclerosis. Their limited attempts at reform failed to address structural problems, setting the stage for Gorbachev’s more radical changes.
Brezhnev’s foreign policy, characterised by periods of détente and renewed confrontation, and the internal challenges of dissent and stagnation, left the Soviet Union vulnerable and brittle. The ineffective rule of his immediate successors only deepened the crises that would soon culminate in the USSR’s eventual collapse.
FAQ
Brezhnev’s commitment to maintaining and expanding Soviet influence worldwide required significant economic and military resources. His administration heavily subsidised satellite states in Eastern Europe and provided military and economic aid to socialist movements in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This included extensive support for regimes in Angola, Ethiopia, and Vietnam. Such foreign commitments strained the Soviet economy, diverting funds from domestic industrial modernisation and consumer goods production. While these actions solidified the USSR’s image as the leader of global communism, they also burdened its economy with costly obligations. By propping up often inefficient or unstable regimes, Brezhnev’s foreign aid failed to deliver proportionate strategic returns. Instead, it increased resentment among Soviet citizens aware of domestic shortages. Furthermore, visible Soviet intervention in local conflicts tarnished the USSR’s image as a force for peace, complicating diplomatic relations. Ultimately, this global overreach deepened economic stagnation and fuelled dissent, undermining the sustainability of Brezhnev’s foreign policy.
Despite advocating détente, Brezhnev simultaneously oversaw one of the largest peacetime military expansions in Soviet history. Soviet defence spending remained exceptionally high throughout the 1970s, with significant investments in nuclear missile systems, conventional armed forces, and a formidable navy. While détente suggested a move towards cooperation and arms limitation, the military build-up signalled ongoing mistrust and an unwillingness to relinquish strategic superiority. This duality alarmed Western policymakers, who saw the USSR’s actions as duplicitous. As a result, the United States also ramped up its defence budget, fearing Soviet global ambitions. The military expansion contradicted SALT’s aims, since technological advancements often circumvented treaty restrictions. It also diverted critical resources away from consumer industries, worsening living standards and contributing to the very economic stagnation that détente sought to alleviate by securing Western trade and technology. In essence, Brezhnev’s parallel pursuit of détente and military supremacy highlighted the contradictions at the heart of Soviet policy, ultimately limiting détente’s credibility.
The Soviet leadership underestimated the complexity and resilience of Afghan resistance, assuming a swift intervention would stabilise the communist government in Kabul. This miscalculation stemmed partly from ideological overconfidence in the Red Army’s ability to quell uprisings and spread socialism. Additionally, Brezhnev and his Politburo believed the West would protest but not react strongly, given the context of détente and the non-alignment of Afghanistan. They overlooked Afghanistan’s rugged geography, decentralised tribal politics, and strong Islamic identity, which fostered fierce, decentralised guerrilla warfare. Intelligence agencies downplayed risks, eager to present optimistic scenarios. The leadership also ignored historical precedents: both the British Empire and local powers had previously struggled to control Afghanistan. Once engaged, the USSR found itself trapped in a drawn-out conflict draining manpower, morale, and finances. The war alienated Muslim citizens within the USSR, sowed distrust among Cold War allies, and revived American commitment to containment. This strategic blunder accelerated Cold War tensions and weakened the USSR internally and externally.
Brezhnev’s foreign policy aimed to expand Soviet influence among non-aligned nations through economic aid, military support, and ideological appeal. He presented the USSR as a champion of anti-colonial struggles, appealing to newly independent states in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Soviet support for regimes in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, along with backing liberation movements, temporarily boosted Soviet prestige in the developing world. However, this policy often led to entanglement in local conflicts and alliances with authoritarian leaders whose governance contradicted socialist ideals, damaging the USSR’s credibility. Many non-aligned states exploited Soviet aid without fully committing to Moscow’s political orbit, maintaining pragmatic ties with both superpowers to maximise benefits. Additionally, Soviet involvement in civil wars created perceptions of neo-imperialism, alienating local populations. While the USSR gained some short-term influence, these ventures rarely delivered lasting alliances or economic gains. The resource drain and limited strategic returns highlighted the unsustainable nature of Brezhnev’s outreach to the non-aligned bloc.
The Soviet media under Brezhnev was tightly controlled and served as a crucial instrument for justifying foreign policy decisions to the domestic audience. State newspapers like Pravda and broadcasting services portrayed Soviet international interventions as necessary acts of socialist solidarity and defensive measures against Western imperialism. The invasion of Afghanistan, for instance, was framed as assistance requested by the legitimate Afghan government to repel foreign-backed terrorists. Détente was simultaneously portrayed as a triumph of Soviet diplomacy, showcasing the USSR’s role as a peacekeeper. Propaganda downplayed or ignored the heavy costs of military build-up and foreign aid, emphasising successes and friendly relations abroad. Criticism of Soviet actions by foreign and internal dissenters was branded as treasonous or misguided. However, despite this tight narrative control, leaks, samizdat publications, and returning soldiers’ testimonies revealed uncomfortable truths, eroding the effectiveness of official propaganda. Ultimately, while media manipulation initially sustained public support, it could not indefinitely conceal policy failures and rising disillusionment.
Practice Questions
To what extent did détente and the SALT agreements achieve lasting stability in US-Soviet relations during the Brezhnev era?
Détente and the SALT agreements brought temporary stability by limiting certain nuclear weapons and promoting dialogue between superpowers, easing Cold War tensions in the early 1970s. However, this stability was superficial and short-lived as mistrust persisted, technological advancements outpaced agreements, and ideological rivalry remained unresolved. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 shattered détente, reigniting hostilities and the arms race. Therefore, while détente and SALT created an illusion of stability, they failed to achieve lasting peace, revealing Brezhnev’s foreign policy as ultimately ineffective in preventing renewed Cold War confrontation.
Explain how internal dissent and the Helsinki Accords undermined Brezhnev’s regime.
Internal dissent, embodied by figures like Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn, exposed contradictions within Brezhnev’s authoritarian rule, highlighting human rights abuses and state hypocrisy. The Helsinki Accords, intended to legitimise Soviet control over Eastern Europe, ironically empowered dissidents by providing a framework to demand freedoms the USSR had pledged to uphold. Helsinki Watch groups monitored compliance, fuelling domestic and international criticism. Combined with nationalist unrest and underground protest movements, this dissent eroded the regime’s legitimacy, increased Western pressure, and showcased the failure of repression to silence opposition, severely challenging Brezhnev’s stagnant, conservative government.
